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Feminists and
Neo-Malthusians:
Past and Present
Alliances
DENNIS HODGSON
SUSAN COTTS WATKINS
THE PROGRAM OF ACTION (United Nations 1994) adopted at the International
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo is intended to estab-
lish international population policy for the next two decades. It is an un-
usual population policy document. The phrase "population problem" never
occurs in its pages; more significantly, no demographic factor is identified
as the principal cause of any problem, and few demographic changes are
sought. The Program assigns (in Principle 4) an explicit feminist agenda to
population programs:
Advancing gender equality and equity and the empowerment of women,
and the elimination of all kinds of violence against women, and ensuring
women's ability to control their own fertility, are cornerstones of population
and development-related programmes.
The purpose of population programs is to promote reproductive health,
defined (in paragraph 7.2) as ensuring women "the capability to repro-
duce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so." A family
planning program is an appropriate part of such a program (7.12) if it em-
ploys no "form of coercion," uses no "incentives and disincentives," and
imposes no demographic "targets" or "quotas" on providers. The document
melds feminist and human rights rhetoric into a programmatic position
that bans explicit attempts to influence reproductive behavior.
Yet a neo-Malthusian subtext still runs through much of the Program
and occasionally breaks through to the surface of the document (3.14):
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Slower population growth has in many countries bought more time to ad-
just to future population increases. This has increased those countries' abil-
ity to attack poverty, protect and repair the environment, and build the base
for future sustainable development. Even the difference of a single decade in
the transition to stabilization levels of fertility can have a considerable posi-
tive impact on quality of life.
The presumptions of a neo-Malthusian movement that for nearly half a
century has sought to make fertility reduction an important objective of
international policy are invariably echoed: low rates of population growth
are beneficial; more rapid fertility declines are better than slower declines;
and population stabilization is an ultimate goal.
Despite this mild neo-Malthusianism, in volume the feminists' com-
mitment to the rights of the individual woman is granted much more sig-
nificance than the neo-Malthusians' emphasis on the prerogatives of the
group. The Program offers a rationale for this bias by asserting (3.16) that
"eliminating social, cultural, political and economic discrimination against
women" is a "prerequisite" for "achieving balance between population and
available resources." Protecting the individual rights of women is thus pre-
sented as an indispensable means for achieving aggregate neo-Malthusian ends.
Cairo distinguished itself from earlier population conferences by hav-
ing its population strategies depend so extensively upon attaining feminist
aims. The Bucharest document (United Nations 1974) called for the equal
participation of women in the economic, social, and political life of their
countries, and specifically sought to increase women's education. The
Mexico City document (United Nations 1984) noted that improving the
status of women was an important goal in and of itself, and that it would
also lower family size. The Cairo document went a step further and con-
tended that unless women's status was improved, lasting population stabi-
lization was unlikely. In the Program of Action the agenda of the neo-
Malthusian movement coalesces with that of the feminist reproductive
health movement, and both neo-Malthusians and feminists at Cairo spoke
in terms of a "common ground." Neo-Malthusians commit themselves to a
gender equity strategy for attaining population stabilization, and program-
matically agree to supplement family planning activities with reproductive
health activities that add several times to program costs. Feminists thereby
gain an ally for gender equity campaigns and a commitment to additional
funding for women's health programs. They offer, in turn, only lukewarm
support for neo-Malthusian goals, and that support is heavily circumscribed
with human rights rhetoric regarding choice.
What conditions will make for a lasting alliance between neo-Malthu-
sians and feminists? This question takes us beyond the specific terrain of
Cairo and into a historical consideration of neo-Malthusianism and femi-
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nism as social movements with ideologies, strategies, and resources, in-
cluding money, members, and organizational allies.' Histories of the neo-
Malthusian movement privilege individuals and organizations, while ac-
counts of Cairo privilege individuals and interest groups (Piotrow 1973;
Donaldson 1990; Harkavy 1995; Campbell 1993; Mclntosh and Finkle
1995). Our story, in contrast, treats neo-Malthusianism and feminism as
social movements, ones aimed at influencing state policy. It privileges ide-
ologies—the set of beliefs that give coherence to the collective activities of
a movement (Buechler 1990: 85)—and the way in which ideologies are
framed, and reframed, in specific political and social contexts (Goffman
1974; Snow et al. 1986; Mueller 1992).^  We examine the extent to which
the neo-Malthusian movement and the feminist movement have common
goals and their perceptions of mutual benefit. As we shall see, feminists
and neo-Malthusians are neither natural allies nor natural opponents. Only
occasionally do the immediate goals of these movements merge, and even
then one or both parties do not necessarily seek an alliance.'
The ideological belief that informs American feminism has been con-
sistent over the past century: an unacceptable inequality exists between
women and men.* Despite this degree of unity, the feminist movement
has often been divided. The main fault lines have been between liberal
feminists who emphasize removing legal barriers to women's equality with
men, and radical feminists who insist equality can only be achieved through
the establishment of positive rights requiring a profound transformation of
economic and social structures (Freedman and Isaacs 1993). Only occa-
sionally have some feminists called for recasting the reproductive role of
women as a way of redressing inequality. Margaret Sanger and the early
birth controllers were one such group.'
We use the term "population control" to refer to movements that have
as their goal changing aggregate population characteristics. These include
pronatalist, eugenic, and antinatalist movements. Although population con-
trol movements may involve coercion, it is a mark of the success of the
reproductive rights feminists that control has been redefined to imply co-
ercion, and the terms "population control" and "population controller" are
no longer respectable. In this article we focus on the antinatai neo-Malthu-
sian population movement, since our interest is in the "common ground"
alliance at Cairo and earlier alliances between neo-Malthusians and femi-
nists. The ideological belief that informs neo-Malthusianism is that exces-
sive population is a major cause of poverty, and that lowering fertility will
facilitate prosperity. A continuing tension in the movement has revolved
around the question whether voluntary programs that simply provide im-
proved access to contraception are sufficient to prevent potential societal
disaster. While it is likely that the majority in the contemporary neo-Malthu-
sian movement believe that such programs are indeed sufficient, at times
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the image of looming catastrophe induced by population growth persuaded
some (Davis 1967) that "beyond family planning measures" were needed
to reduce fertility, measures that have, at one time or another, included
advocacy in the media, targets, incentives and/or disincentives, and out-
right coercion. Currently, most neo-Malthusians prefer to identify their goal
as "population stabilization," not "population control"; in current usage,
the latter implies coercion, the former does not. Obviously, exorcising all
hint of coercion from neo-Malthusianism greatly enhances its compatibil-
ity vkdth feminism.
We confine our examination to the interaction between American
feminists and American neo-Malthusians. We recognize the important in-
ternational component to both social movements, evidenced by interna-
tional meetings and considerable cooperation among activists from many
countries, and we recognize that the Program of Action was fashioned by
numerous actors, among whom feminists from Southern countries were
prominent. Nonetheless, the ideology and objectives of social movements
are still crucially responsive to national conditions. A focus on American
feminists and American neo-Malthusians is justified because their relation-
ship has much to do with the present cast of international population policy.^
Also, since the implementation of the Cairo agenda must still be funded,
and much is expected of the American government, understanding the dy-
namics of this relationship in the United States provides a special insight
into the viability of that policy. Our analysis begins in the early twentieth
century and stops with the Cairo conference. This extended time period
helps us to uncover long-term changes in movement interactions, and al-
lows us to identify the conditions under which alliances develop and flourish
as well as those under which they do not.
Feminists and neo-Malthusians have encountered each other during
recurring attempts both have made to shape reproductive behavior by in-
fluencing state policy. First we examine early-twentieth-century encoun-
ters, when most American feminists were focused on gaining suffrage for
women and when American neo-Malthusians had to contend with suc-
cessful population movements—eugenics, and immigration restriction—that
were animated by concerns of population composition rather than fear of
overpopulation. We divide the post-World War II era into four periods:
1945-65, 1965-74, 1974-85, and 1985-95. This periodization is based on
important events in one or both of the movements and is somewhat arbi-
trary since there are trends that cross several periods.
The 1945-65 period is characterized by a quiet alliance between a
growing number of neo-Malthusians, located primarily in foundations and
universities, and a mildly feminist planned parenthood movement. It ends
with the adoption of an international neo-Malthusian policy by the US
government and the establishment of the National Organization for Wom-
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en (NOW). The period 1965-74 is characterized by a rapid growth in the
resources and the global networks of the neo-Malthusian movement. There
is a revival of the feminist movement, which had been quiescent since the
1920s, and with it the beginning of feminist critiques of international popu-
lation programs, many of them from the Left and largely ignored by the
population establishment. The 1974-85 period begins with a turning point
for neo-Malthusianism, when the international community rejects calls for
an all-out fertility control campaign at Bucharest and adopts instead a mild
developmentalist position that ensconces birth control firmly within indi-
vidual-rights rhetoric. Combat with a pro-life movement aroused by the
Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 rallies American feminists
around a pro-choice reproductive agenda that becomes a requirement for
feminist identity. The last period, 1985-95, sees the further weakening of
neo-Malthusian ideology and the skillful elaboration of a feminist popula-
tion policy and a strategy with which to implement it.^
Population movements and feminism:
Early alliances
Social movements arise, and succeed or fail, in specific historical contexts.
The contrast is stark between the contemporary neo-Malthusian and femi-
nist movements and their predecessors at the beginning of the twentieth
century.* Although back then a small neo-Malthusian movement pointed
to the link between numerous progeny and poverty, the larger eugenics
movement with its interest in shaping population processes to achieve a
desirable population composition was far more influential. Among those
who wanted greater equality between women and men, a consensus ex-
isted that gaining political equality (specifically, suffrage) ought to be the
primary goal. A few figures attempted alliances between the women's move-
ment and population movements. Margaret Sanger, for example, forged a
birth control movement, led by middle-class women, that was aimed at
legalizing access to contraception. She fashioned an ideology that neatly
combined feminism, neo-Malthusianism, and eugenics. Rebuffed by suf-
frage leaders, she eventually formed a sturdy alliance with neo-Malthu-
sians and eugenists.
In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt decried (p. 550) the "race sui-
cide" of upper-class women, many deeply involved in the suffrage move-
ment, who were avoiding marriage or having small families: "the greatest
problem of civilization is to be found in the fact that the well-to-do fami-
lies tend to die out; there results, in consequence, a tendency to the elimi-
nation instead of the survival of the fittest." At the time eugenists worried
that the "prudent and thoughtful" ("whose children the race needs") would
be the ones to practice birth control, while knowledge of contraception
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was unlikely to affect the fertility of the "reckless" lower classes (Clarke
1896: 357; Popenoe 1917: 6). Such compositional worries fueled both op-
position to the legalization of contraception and the immigration restric-
tion movement.
Women in the suffrage movement, the principal women's rights move-
ment at the time, had to respond to charges of race suicide. A majority
chose to avoid a direct confrontation with a movement that had a US presi-
dent as a spokesman. They accepted "the eugenic logic of race suicide
theory," but questioned the eugenic efficacy of making women bear un-
wanted children who "were likely to be neglected and therefore inferior"
(Gordon 1990: 141). The suffragists' goal was to convince a substantial ma-
jority of male legislators that giving women the vote was wise social policy.
In the cultural climate of the early twentieth century, this could best be
done by depicting women as strong upholders of traditional values whose
presence in the voting booth would lend support for moral renewal. At
this time not advancing a reproductive rights agenda was thought to be
the wisest feminist tactic. However, new feminist voices, ones that spoke
explicitly of the need for women to gain control of their reproductive des-
tinies, made this strategy difficult to sustain.
Emma Goldman, an anarchist, attended the 1900 International Neo-
Malthusian Conference in Paris and began promoting contraception and
"voluntary motherhood" in lectures and in her periodical. Mother Earth
(Woloch 1984: 367). She took a socialist neo-Malthusian position, calling
on working women as a class to "no longer be a party to the crime of bring-
ing hapless children into the world only to be ground into dust by the wheel
of capitalism and to be torn into shreds in trenches and battlefields" (1916:
470). The working class could improve its negotiating position with capi-
talists by restricting the production of new workers, and they could crimp
the expansionist plans of militarist leaders with "birth strikes." Contracep-
tion could be used to bring the ruling class to its knees. Margaret Sanger,
who did the most of anyone to establish the birth control movement in the
United States, initially adopted much of Goldman's orientation. A socialist
and member of the International Workers of the World (IWW), Sanger
founded The Woman Rebel in 1914 to bring knowledge of contraception to
the masses. Sanger was also a member of "the new intellectuals" among
American socialists who argued that "sex be made a major issue of revolu-
tionary politics and women's liberation" (Buhle 1983: 259).
Both Goldman and Sanger purposely broke laws and attracted crowds
and enormous attention for "birth control," the term coined in 1914 to
represent Sanger's campaign (Chesler 1992: 97). Contraception and small
families now were linked to feminism, radicalism, and sexual liberation.
Despite the evidence that the birth control movement was capable of mo-
bilizing women, suffragists remained ambivalent about it. The interest sur-
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rounding birth control reflected a new facet of feminism, more radical and
sexual, that attracted a younger and more nonconformist constituency for
the cause. This new sexual agenda, however, antagonized a public just com-
ing to accept the suffrage rationale that women's rights advocates had care-
fully constructed over decades. When Sanger sought allies in the women's
movement by asking 50 prominent women in 1915 to state publicly that
they believed in and practiced birth control, she was turned down and told
to "wait until we get the vote" (Gordon 1990: 233-236). When she asked
Carrie Chapman Catt for use of her name as sponsor for the American Birth
Control League, Catt responded that while "I am no enemy of you and yours
Your reform is too narrow to appeal to me, and too sordid." If feminists in
the 1910s had a "common ground" position, it was that suffrage was their
primary objective. The struggle for women to control their reproductive
lives did not provide a foundation for feminist unity as it does today.
The birth control movement underwent rapid and consequential
change from 1915 to 1920. Sanger started the period unequivocally on the
Left: taking part in IWW strikes and publishing in The Woman Rebel articles
defending assassination and denouncing marriage. In 1914 she fled the
country to escape prosecution for breaking the Comstock laws censoring
literature deemed obscene. Yet on her return she adopted a rhetoric that
was more standard neo-Malthusian and eugenic than anticapitalist: namely,
more birth control would lead to less poverty and fewer defective offspring
(Woloch 1984: 373). She even argued that only medical professionals ought
to distribute contraceptives, a less radical position than that taken by Mary
Ware Dennett, a middle-class activist whose National Birth Control League
was fighting for the unfettered distribution of contraceptive information.
We believe that this change in Sanger's stance was due, at least in part, to
her recognition that she needed new allies if she was to achieve her aim of
legalizing contraception. In 1917 she broke her ties with the Left. The Bol-
shevik Revolution had provoked worries that a communist upheaval threat-
ened the United States, and thus an alliance with the Left was not advan-
tageous. To dampen suffragists' concerns that birth control was "too sordid,"
Sanger sought to remove the explosive sexual component from birth con-
trol by treating it as a medical issue and placing the distribution of contra-
ceptives in the hands of physicians. Yet even after the passage of the 19th
Amendment granting women suffrage in 1920, Sanger could not get wom-
en's organizations to support her movement. Birth control remained too
controversial and too potentially divisive for the National Woman's Party,
the National League of Women Voters, and even the Child Welfare and
Social Hygiene Committees of the League of Women Voters to support.'
Sanger, a pragmatic activist (McCann 1994), thus turned for allies both
to the tiny neo-Malthusian movement and to the influential eugenics move-
ment. She asked Edward Alsworth Ross to write (1920) neo-Malthusian
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defenses of birth control in her new journal. Birth Control Review, and re-
cruited Lothrop Stoddard, whose The Rising Tide of Color Against White World
Supremacy (1920) depicted a slowly increasing white race being over-
whelmed by more rapidly increasing "colored" races, to serve on the board
of the American Birth Control League along with the eugenist C. C. Little.
To the lower social strata who suffered from poverty and ill health, she
issued neo-Malthusian missives on the improved health and economic well-
being that would come to those with small families. To the elite who har-
bored eugenic fears, she argued that bettering the race required improving
the access of the less fit to contraception.
By 1920 Sanger had forged a birth control movement, led by middle-
class women, aimed at procuring for doctors the legal right to distribute
contraceptives to women. Birth control remained a feminist endeavor
(Sanger 1922: 11): "Birth control is the means by which woman attains
basic freedom." It is also a neo-Malthusian enterprise (1922: 204-205): "a
science which teaches that poverty and social evils can be greatly reduced
by encouraging people to have small families." Additionally, birth control
is the foundation for all eugenic programs (1919: 12): "Eugenics without
Birth Control seems to us a house built upon the sands." In practical terms,
the alliance with eugenists was probably of greater utility for Sanger's birth
control movement than her alliance with the neo-Malthusians.
The alliance with the eugenists was made possible by a change in the
eugenists' assessment of birth control during the 1920s. It had become so
prevalent among the "higher quality stock" that they no longer feared its
legalization. A new interpretation of fertility trends contributed to this re-
versal. A general downward trend in the fertility of all class and ethnic
groups had become evident, and the inverse relationship between class and
fertility that panicked the turn-of-the-century eugenist now appeared to
be temporary. This same downward trend in US fertility, however, less-
ened the salience of neo-Malthusian rationales for birth control. In 1925
Louis Dublin and Alfred Lotka (pp. 328-329) developed "intrinsic" vital
rates that controlled for the age structure's influence on crude rates, and
dramatically announced that the average American woman in 1920 was
having only half a child more than was needed to maintain a stationary
population. Dublin was quick (1926) to use intrinsic measures to generate
a sense of crisis, even identifying excessive birth control as a national prob-
lem. He predicted (1932: 233) the onset of actual depopulation "during
the next five or ten years," attacked Sanger by name, and argued that birth
control was "a one-sided movement" that had convinced too many people
to exercise "much more birth control than was either good for them or for
the community at large." When a significant pronatalist movement devel-
oped and fears of domestic depopulation, not overpopulation, predomi-
nated, neo-Malthusianism lost much of its utility for Sanger.
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During this period, and through much of the 1930s, it even became
problematic to decry overpopulation abroad. The popularity of Ross's Stand-
ing Room Only? (1927) reflected a genuine interest in the geopolitical rami-
fications for the West of the differential rates of population growth then
evident among nations. But in 1929 Warren Thompson, studying these
trends, produced (1929a) the first expression of demographic transition
theory. Countries industrializing and urbanizing, he theorized, would ex-
perience a Western sequence of demographic changes: a movement from
an initial state of low population growth with high birth and death rates,
to one of rapid population growth with differentially declining vital rates,
to one of low growth with low vital rates. This theory became politically
suspect because of the particular historical context, specifically the policy
implications that Thompson drew from applying it to Japanese population
dynamics. He concluded (1929b: 43) that Japan, in the midst of its rapid
population growth, had only one alternative: "to expand by the acquisi-
tion of more territory." This would increase the Japanese supply of natural
resources needed for rapid industrialization while providing relatively empty
areas capable of absorbing a portion of Japan's increasing population. Thomp-
son actually called on European nations to voluntarily cede to Japan "lands
not used and not needed by them" in Southeast Asia so that war could be
avoided (1930: 366). Such "scientific" support for the frequently voiced
Japanese contention that their commercial and military expansion in Asia
was necessitated by population pressure endeared this theory to few West-
ern policymakers, and it was largely ignored, even by academics, for the
next decade.
During an era when Lebensraum arguments for imperialism abounded,
emphasizing the reality of overpopulation became politically dangerous.'"
Sanger entered more fully into the eugenists' camp. Although she saw the
eugenists as valuable allies and shared their ideology to a considerable ex-
tent, she parted with them on some issues. She never approved of the state
coercing women to bear children, for example. She did, however, approve
of the state limiting the reproduction of the unfit, for instance by offering
"a bonus or a yearly pension to all obviously unfit parents who allow them-
selves to be sterilized by a harmless and scientific means" (1926: 299). She
held that certain conditions "demand the exercise of birth control": having
a heritable disease; having had a defective child; and even being poor (1925:
31-32). Such positions were enough to earn Sanger the support of most
eugenists, and the American Eugenics Society formally endorsed Sanger's
birth control campaign in 1933 (Chesler 1992: 343).
The alliance that Margaret Sanger fashioned with the eugenists was a
sturdy one. Both movements had the goal of increasing the access of the
lower classes to birth control. Both movements perceived mutual benefit
in an alliance. Eugenists thought themselves lucky to have an ally who
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could market birth control as a way to better health and wellbeing, not as
a preventive for race degradation, and Sanger much appreciated the pres-
tige and scientific credentials that eugenists brought to her cause of con-
vincing the public of the need to legalize access to birth control. Finally,
Sanger shared with the eugenists a conviction that societal benefit would
come from the "less fit" having fewer children.
Our historical examination leads us to believe that shared goals, per-
ceived mutual benefit in an affiliation, and compatible ideologies are pre-
conditions for a lasting alliance between social movements. This particular
one lasted through the 1930s, and in fact became so strong that some saw
(Fairchild 1940) the two movements merging: "One of the outstanding fea-
tures of the present conference [1940 Annual Meeting of the Birth Con-
trol Federation] is the practically universal acceptance of the fact that these
two great movements [eugenics and birth control] have now come to such
a thorough understanding and have drawn so close together as to be al-
most indistinguishable." During that decade Sanger withdrew from lead-
ership positions in the birth control movement. By 1939 the Birth Control
Federation of America, formed by the merger of Sanger's Clinical Research
Bureau and the American Birth Control League, was led by male profes-
sionals who were calling for more babies from the fit (Chesler 1992: 392-
393;McCann 1994: 134).
Although the alliance between the birth control movement and
eugenists remained strong through the 1930s, American eugenists suffered
as public opinion began turning against a movement so closely associated
with Nazi Germany. Had Sanger been driven only by the goals of her birth
control movement and related tactical considerations, she might have pub-
licly distanced herself from the eugenists, a move she never made. Appar-
ently alliances can weaken as well as invigorate a movement. Feminism as
a distinct movement fared even more poorly than did eugenics during the
1930s, and nearly disappeared from the American scene (Buechler 1990:
2). Those within the birth control movement whose primary goal was to
further gender equity were unable to prevent the systematic distancing of the
movement from its feminist roots, symbolized by its rechristening in 1942 as
the "Planned Parenthood Movement," a term that centered attention on fami-
lies and children and not on women and sex (Gordon 1990: 340).
Neo-Malthusianisin and feminism, 1945-65:
A second alliance
Changes wrought by World War II and the Nazi and Fascist regimes of
Europe significantly altered American population movements: eugenics lost
its public acceptability, and an unexpected postwar baby boom ended the
fears of domestic depopulation that had produced the pronatalist move-
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ment of the late 1920s and 1930s. At midcentury few considered domestic
demographic trends to be problematic. However, when certain American
students of population, primarily located at Princeton University, turned
to what were then called the underdeveloped countries, they saw much
cause for alarm. With inexpensive public health measures dramatically re-
ducing mortality, their populations were described as exploding. This growth
threatened to thwart industrialization plans. Retrograde or stagnant eco-
nomic conditions were thought to be a breeding ground for communism.
American population specialists successfully solicited the support of John
D. Rockefeller 3rd and Ford Foundation officers, and began a multi-decade
effort "to create a transnational epistemic community around the principles
of population growth as an obstacle to economic development and family
planning programs as a feasible solution" (Crane 1993: 358). This coalition
of concerned academics and foundation leaders established in elite US uni-
versities a policy-oriented demographic discipline focused on third world
population problems that provided the intellectual backbone for an influ-
ential neo-Malthusian movement in the United States, one that quickly
gained international adherents.
Initially much attention focused on the large population of newly in-
dependent India. When it was viewed in conjunction with India's limited
arable land, the specter of more people than could be adequately fed ap-
peared to be a near-term possibility. Controlling population size seemed
essential to averting famine and malnutrition. Since similar population/
resource relationships were corrmion in Asia, the population crisis was ini-
tially framed as a peculiarly "Asiatic problem."'^ Would food and natural
resource supplies be adequate to feed, clothe, and shelter large and dense
populations that were growing rapidly? Would there be sufficient resources
for such populations to urbanize and industrialize even if their basic needs
could be met?
At first these academics were pessimistic about the possibility of stimu-
lating fertility decline by bringing contraception directly to peasants
(Hodgson 1983). As Thompson had in 1929, they encapsulated the demo-
graphic history of Western populations into demographic transition theory,
in which fertility decline was identified as a consequence of industrializa-
tion and urbanization.'^ Now, however, when examining the situation of
postwar underdeveloped regions, they concluded that population growth
trends were hindering efforts to transform traditional agrarian economies
into modern industrial ones. This posed a demographic conundrum: the
modernization process was being stymied by a demographic stumbling block
that itself, according to their understanding of demographic/economic in-
teractions, could only be humanely eliminated through rapid moderniza-
tion. Although they had no feasible, non-catastrophic resolution to this
conundrum, they hesitated to recommend family planning programs since
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they assumed that peasants would be little motivated to practice contra-
ception. This iteration of transition theory, arising in a different context,
one where third world population growth was seen as threatening the in-
terests of an embattled "free world," elicited greater interest among policy-
makers and academics than had Thompson's 1929 version.
Birth control advocates were considerably less gloomy than academ-
ics about prospects for family planning in less developed countries. In 1946
Margaret Sanger came out of retirement in an effort to internationalize
the planned parenthood movement (Chesler 1992: 407^63), attending a
family planning meeting in Stockholm, Sweden where a call for an inter-
national planned parenthood organization was initiated. In 1948 she orga-
nized the International Congress on Population and World Resources in
Relation to the Family, in Cheltenham, England, attended by representa-
tives from 17 countries and from the newly formed United Nations. She
was appointed chair of the committee that formally established the Inter-
national Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) at the Second International
Conference in Bombay, India, in 1952. Sanger co-directed the IPPF until
her retirement in 1959, and imprinted it with her feminist belief that birth
control was essential for women's freedom. The IPPF during this period,
however, was not well funded, and its ability to aid in the establishment of
family planning clinics in less developed countries was limited."
When significant funds for a global fertility control effort began to
flow from foundations in 1952, they were largely funneled to the popula-
tion specialists, not the IPPF birth controllers (Piotrow 1973: 15-18). John
D. Rockefeller 3rd convened a conference in 1952 under the auspices of
the US National Academy of Sciences to examine the growing imbalance
in Asia's vital rates (Notestein 1982: 616-611; Bachrach and Bergman 1973:
44—46). Five months later the Population Council was established with
Rockefeller as its president. During that same year the Ford Foundation
began funding population activities (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986: 32). By
1961 these funds had spawned seven new university-based demography
programs aimed at training specialists on the population problems of devel-
oping countries (Stycos 1967). Research on a contraceptive pill increased
optimism that focused interventions were possible. By the mid-1950s most
population specialists were advocating efforts to bring birth control "directly"
to peasants. Pilot family plaiming projeas were begun in India and elsewhere.
Such activities were considered controversial during the 1950s. At the
United Nations World Population Conference held in Rome in 1954, a coa-
lition of Catholics and communists prevented consideration of any action
agenda.'** President Dwight Eisenhower feared Roman Catholic opposition
and refused to support international fertility control: "When I was Presi-
dent, I opposed the use of Federal funds to provide birth control informa-
tion to countries we were aiding because I felt this would violate the deep-
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est convictions of a large group of taxpayers" (1963: 27). Yet voluntary
family planning programs were considered by influential opinion makers
to be excellent philosophical complements to the gradualist development
strategies being promoted by US foreign aid programs; and powerfully po-
sitioned neo-Malthusians began making concerted efforts during the late
1950s to gain government support for the movement."
Meanwhile alliances were made between planned parenthood pro-
ponents and population specialists. Planned parenthood representatives and
members of the Population Council met in 1955, 1956, and 1957 "to de-
velop and define general principles for promoting birth control overseas"
(Piotrow 1973: 14). Population Council and IPPF representatives discussed
contraceptive technology in 1957, and planned small field tests of the birth
control pill in Los Angeles and in Puerto Rico (Chesler 1992: 443-444). By
the early 1960s they had developed a standard choreography for encour-
aging third world governments to adopt national family planning programs.
First, foundations would grant fellowship support for nationals to study
demography at various US population centers, where they would absorb a
crisis orientation toward population growth. Next, a "KAP" survey of the
local population's knowledge, attitudes, and practice of contraception would
be undertaken. The survey results would be used to document the exist-
ence of a "ready market" for birth control, to convince any skeptical na-
tional leaders and bureaucrats that family planning was possible,'* and to
prepare the way for the national planned parenthood association, with fi-
nancial and technical assistance from IPPF, to establish a limited number
of clinics within the country. Successfully-operating private clinics would
be used to demonstrate the feasibility of establishing a national family plan-
ning program.
Initially, tensions existed in this alliance between population special-
ists and planned parenthood proponents. During this period planned par-
enthood proponents were even more action-oriented than the population
specialists. William Vogt, president of the Planned Parenthood Federation
of America, wrote one of the earliest and most influential of the postwar
neo-Malthusian tracts. Road to Survival (1948), at a time when specialists
still questioned the usefulness of family planning campaigns. And when
Hugh Moore published a shrill neo-Malthusian tract in 1956, The Popula-
tion Bomb, the IPPF welcomed him into its ranks while the population spe-
cialists tried to distance themselves from what they considered extremism
(Piotrow 1973: 18-19). Strains also arose from differences in the power
and financial strength of these two players (Stycos 1968: 25):
For decades in the United States, small organized groups of courageous wom-
en have been insisting that the health and social welfare of the woman de-
pend on the ability rationally to regulate the number and timing of her births.
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Such arguments received the degree of respect and attention normally ac-
corded to small organized groups of courageous women in the United States.
At the same time, however, a handful of less vociferous but more influential
men of affairs began to be concerned about the economic and political im-
plications of world population growth, and in particular, about the growth
of the under-developed areas. Their fears included Starvation, Unrest, War,
and Communism. . . . When thrown together at an occasional conference,
they regarded each other with the combined suspicions and hope of exploi-
tation found only at a social function of Ivy League boys and townie girls.
Some population specialists at first doubted the usefulness of IPPF's
"feminist" bias, worrying that providing contraception exclusively to women
might lessen its acceptability in male-dominated societies. At Sanger's
Cheltenham conference in 1948 Frank Lorimer proposed "isolating con-
traception from what he perceived to be the complicating and variable fac-
tors of gender relations and sexual ethics," and argued against the planned
parenthood method of establishing family planning clinics for women
(Chesler 1992: 410). Dudley Kirk, speaking to an IPPF audience in New
Delhi in 1959, recommended that "male" methods of contraception, spe-
cifically condoms and withdrawal, be used in India in preference to expen-
sive "female" ones that required a medical infrastructure (Chesler 1992:
451). J. Mayone Stycos complained that IPPF's feminist bias led to an "em-
phasis on female methods for female patients, and the justification of fam-
ily planning largely in terms of its benefits for the female. . . . Even the
most effective male methods are viewed with some suspicion" (1962: 481-
482). However, there was little evidence of male interest in using the meth-
ods at their disposal, such as withdrawal. Eventually, the population spe-
cialists agreed with their plarmed parenthood partners about the importance
of female methods of birth control, and thus women became the "targets"
of family planning programs (Watkins 1993).
Most population specialists came to view the IPPF's moderate femi-
nist rationale for family planning as a valuable supplement to their eco-
nomic and political arguments for fertility control. They were in no way
pressured into accepting this position by a feminist social movement, since
no such movement existed at the time. Acceptance was based on their be-
lief that the traditional male-dominated social structures of agrarian soci-
eties were organized in ways that imposed high fertility. In such a context
they came to hope that women might seek to control their fertility but
simply lacked the means to do so. A family planning program might, there-
fore, fulfill a suppressed female demand for birth control. Although not
interested in equalizing gender relations in third world societies, popula-
tion specialists were looking for evidence that family planning programs
would work in such societies. On this score, the mild feminist assumptions
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that informed the birth control movement—that all women desire to gain
control of their reproductive destinies—provided grounds for optimism
about lowering fertility at a time when few other reasons for such opti-
mism could be discerned.
By 1960 both planned parenthood proponents and population spe-
cialists sensed that the American public was ready to support an overt neo-
Malthusian movement. Nobel laureates signed statements condemning the
scourge of overpopulation that were then presented to the United Nations
(Chesler 1992: 456^60). The Population Council published an explicit neo-
Malthusian tract. This CroM/ded World (Osborn 1960), aimed at a general
audience. Both planned parenthood advocates and population specialists
pressed for the United States to adopt an international neo-Malthusian
policy, and there was growing optimism that this would soon occur. In
1963, Sanger, in one of her last public statements on population, expressed
her deep satisfaction at the success of the neo-Malthusian movement (quoted
in Chesler 1992:462):
Fifty years ago I realized what was coming—the population explosion we
hear so much about today, women having more and more babies until there's
neither food nor room for them on earth. And I tried to do something about
it. Now I have thousands of people all over tbe world aware of that problem
and its only possible solutions—family limitation and planned parenthood.
The alliance that population specialists and birth controllers forged
during the 1950s was deep-seated. They shared an ideology and a demo-
graphic goal, much as Sanger and the eugenists had earlier. Both wished
to bring birth control to the masses of the world's people who had limited
access to modern methods of contraception. The birth controllers working
for Planned Parenthood saw great benefit flowing to the individual, espe-
cially the individual woman, from having a smaller family. The neo-Malthu-
sians were convinced that the resolution of societal and geopolitical crises
required the lowering of birth rates. Their shared belief in the beneficial
effects of lower fertility united the parties.
Some now contend (Gordon 1990: 386) that during this period the
alliance between feminists and neo-Malthusians was lopsided, that neo-
Malthusianism overwhelmed the original feminist intent of the birth con-
trol movement:
Descended from Malthusianism, population control had distinctly separate
roots from the U.S. birth-control movement. Yet Planned Parenthood, tbe
organizational heir to the birth-control movement, married the two, in a
union in which the birth-control "wife" was subordinated to the population
control "husband."
484 FEMINISTS AND NEO-MALTHUSIANS
Margaret Sanger, however, might have disagreed with this assessment. Her
espousal of neo-Malthusianism spanned many decades and is difficult to
doubt. Over the period 1945 to 1965 most birth controllers and most popu-
lation specialists became confident that inducing third world women to
practice contraception would simultaneously improve these individuals'
social and economic situation and alleviate societal problems. The con-
temporary concern that state population policies might encroach on the
reproductive freedom of third world women was nowhere to be found.
Not until a revived feminist movement began to question neo-Malthusian
intentions would "wife" and "husband" overtly disagree."
Neo-Malthusianism and feminism, 1965-74:
An alliance is questioned
By the end of the 1950s the perception of the "population problem" had
undergone a decided alteration. Emphasis shifted from population size to
population growth rates, and the list of countries experiencing a problem
expanded from Asia to include nearly all third world countries. Research-
ers (Coale and Hoover 1958; Enke 1963) developed models that quantified
the economic cost of continued high fertility and found it substantial, at
least in the short run. Departing from the colorless language of academics,
in an unusual 1968 issue of Demography academics and foundation repre-
sentatives alike spoke of the efforts to control third world population growth
in the language of a battle, a holy war (Watkins 1993). Some were so con-
vinced of the seriousness of a population crisis that there were calls to move
"beyond family planning" (Davis 1967)—for example by instituting a tax
on children or by paying individuals to be sterilized. Paul Ehrlich began his
best-selling neo-Malthusian tract. The Population Bomb (1968), with a pre-
diction of imminent global catastrophe: "The battle to feed all of humanity
is over. In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve
to death." Soon thereafter Paul and Anne Ehrlich proposed laws that "would
make bearing a third child illegal and that would require an abortion to
terminate all such pregnancies" (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1972: 372).
Issues of coercion generated debate within the neo-Malthusian move-
ment (Berelson 1969), and the Population Council hired an ethicist. The
more drastic proposals to go "beyond family planning" (i.e., to introduce
significant disincentives) were rejected within the population establishment,
probably because they troubled some of its more influential members but
also because such proposals were politically problematic. The immediate
task was to convince nervous political leaders, both at home and abroad,
of the practicality of fertility control. Suggestions that it might require highly
coercive measures would hardly serve that purpose. Thus, the alliance be-
tween the neo-Malthusian movement and the international planned par-
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enthood movement continued to be characterized by a voluntaristic and
mildly feminist stance. Many neo-Malthusians were troubled by the lim-
ited success that existing family planning programs such as India's were
experiencing, but publicly they remained confident that if the "facts" of
the case were presented effectively, women would realize that small fami-
lies were good for the development of the country and also good for them-
selves. They therefore sanctioned propaganda campaigns aimed at foster-
ing small-family norms as acceptable "educational" efforts, and considered
the offering of modest material incentives to contraceptive acceptors to be
an effective marketing tool. They blamed the drawbacks of available con-
traceptive techniques for the limited success of family planning programs,
and the Population Council took the lead in developing female contracep-
tives (the copper IUD and then Norplant®) that, unlike barrier methods
and the contraceptive pill, did not require sustained motivation for use.
An additional advantage of the IUD (and, later, injections of Depo-Provera)
was that a woman could more easily use it "privately," without the knowl-
edge of her spouse or other family members (Lande 1995)—although hus-
bands and wives can disagree on whether this is an advantage or a prob-
lem (Watkins, Rutenberg, and Wilkinson, forthcoming).
The immediate aim of the alliance was to influence state policy. Neo-
Malthusianism had attracted support well beyond private foundations and
had become a significant social movement. By 1970 over 88 percent of
Americans believed that the world was experiencing a population prob-
lem, and over 70 percent thought that the United States was also (Westoff
and McCarthy 1979). In two national fertility studies, in 1965 and 1970,
women who considered US population growth a serious problem expressed
intentions for substantially smaller family sizes than those who were not
concerned, as well as much larger reductions in these intentions between
the two surveys (Preston 1986: 180). Foundations supported the establish-
ment of nongovernmental organizations such as the Population Crisis Com-
mittee and Zero Population Growth that recruited members, raised funds,
and lobbied the US government to become involved in molding demo-
graphic processes abroad. Senator Ernest Gruening launched hearings be-
ginning in 1965, and Congressional support grew (Piotrow 1973). By 1965
President Lyndon Johnson cautiously brought the US government on board
with the establishment of population offices in the Department of State
and in the United States Agency for International Development (Green
1993: 305-308). Funding for USAID's population program expanded rap-
idly and Reimert Ravenholt, head of this program, argued for a policy to
"inundate" third world countries with contraceptives (Donaldson 1990).
In 1969 President Richard Nixon created the Commission on Population
Growth and the American Future with John D. Rockefeller 3rd as its head.
The Commission issued a fundamentally neo-Malthusian report (1972) rec-
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ommending "that the nation welcome and plan for a stabilized popula-
tion." The Commission's recommendations of legalizing abortion and giv-
ing minors access to contraception without parental consent, however,
aroused Roman Catholic opposition (McHugh 1984: 411-412) and Presi-
dent Nixon, facing reelection, disavowed the report when it was issued in
May 1972.
Following its substantial success at influencing the US government,
the alliance's attentions turned to the United Nations, whose collaboration
would give legitimacy to global population control efforts and help avoid
charges of imperialism. The Vietnam conflict had generated much anti-
American feeling, and many third world governments were suspicious of
the US government's motives for supporting global fertility control. In De-
cember 1974 Henry Kissinger directed the National Security Council to ex-
amine the "implications of worldwide population growth for U.S. security
and overseas interests." The Council's secret National Security Study Memo-
randum 200 found that rapid population growth fostered political instabil-
ity, and it identified 13 countries of "special U.S. political and strategic in-
terest" where "population stabilization" policies should be pursued.'* The
Memorandum recommended (Mumford 1994: 140) discretion: "The US
can help to minimize charges of an imperialist motivation behind its support
of population activities by repeatedly asserting that such support derives from
a concern with: (a) the right of the individual couple to determine freely
and responsibly their number and spacing of children . . . and (b) the fun-
damental social and economic development of poor countries. . . . " Where
diplomatic relations were strained, the Memorandum suggested (Mumford
1994: 146) providing aid through "other donors and/or from private and
international organizations (many of which receive contributions from
AID)." The United Nations Fund for Population Activities, already estab-
lished in 1969 largely as a result of US efforts, became a major conduit for
US funds by the mid-1970s (Symonds and Carder 1973; Johnson 1987:
26-28).
By the end of the period, then, the neo-Malthusian movement had
gone well beyond the limited efforts of the previous period. It was success-
ful in influencing public opinion and attracting resources. It had gained as
allies corporate leaders, academics with relevant scientific expertise, the
US government with its deep pockets and security concerns, and, particu-
larly important for a movement with international aims, the United Na-
tions. A substantial number of third world governments had accepted neo-
Malthusian premises and had adopted fertility control programs. However,
the fetninist credentials of neo-Malthusians were about to be challenged.
Second-wave feminism, sparked by the publication of Betty Friedan's
Feminine Mystique in 1963 and by the establishment of the National Orga-
nization for Women in 1965, shared with its predecessors earlier in the
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century an ideology aimed at the advancement of women. But there were
shifts in feminist ideology and goals that in retrospect can be seen as barri-
ers to an alliance between feminists and neo-Malthusians in this period.
The revived feminist movement was part of an efflorescence of "new social
movements," such as the civil rights movement and the protests against
the war in Vietnam. Conditions (e.g., segregated schools, the draft) that
previously had been defined as natural or at best unfortunate were rede-
fined as injustices, and some took to the streets to make their voices heard,
marching on Washington, burning draft cards, and shedding bras (Piven
and Cloward 1977). The political mobilization tactics of the new protest
movements were much in contrast to the orderly hierarchies of the neo-
Malthusian establishment.
The revived feminist movement demonstrated considerably more di-
versity during this period than did the neo-Malthusian movement. Liberal
and radical members had distinct agendas, assessed the extent of women's
subjugation differently, and sought different remedies to end it. Reproduc-
tive control fit well with the agendas of liberal feminists. Primarily con-
cerned with domestic issues, their goal was to achieve equality for women
in the workplace. To compete with men, women had to be able to coordi-
nate family formation decisions with career needs. Whereas public advo-
cacy for birth control had been judged politically risky by the leaders of the
women's suffrage movement, now that the political context had changed
liberal feminists considered support for birth control to be essential. The
Supreme Court's 1965 decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, finally gave mar-
ried couples a constitutionally protected right to contraception. Eight years
later the Court in Roe v. Wade dramatically expanded birth control rights to
include abortion. For liberal feminists, then, the greater accessibility to con-
traception and abortion achieved in this period was a prerequisite for reach-
ing their primary goals and was largely uncontroversial.
Population control, however, was controversial for the radical femi-
nists, who—then as now—had different ideologies from those of liberal
feminists. Feminist critiques of neo-Malthusianism in this period were
"tributaries of a more general stream of agitation" (Snow and Benford 1992),
ones that exphcitly challenged the power and control of the white male
establishment. US involvement in the Vietnam conflict revitalized the po-
litical Left. AUiances developed among these movements based on over-
lapping memberships and a common belief in the possibility of major so-
cial change (Bearman and Everett 1993). The neo-Malthusian movement,
largely because of the close establishment ties it forged during the 1960s,
was not part of this Left-leaning coalition of social movements." The neo-
Malthusian movement's interest in lowering the fertility of the world's poor
women of color raised questions: black organizations viewed population
control with suspicion, the more radical of them labeling it genocide
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(Bambara 1970; Weisbord 1975), and the antiwar Left saw it as a part of
an imperialist strategy for third world pacification.
The neo-Malthusians' third world fertility control programs attracted
concerted opposition from leftist feminists. Early in the 1970s Linda Gor-
don disparaged the post-World War II neo-Malthusian movement by trac-
ing its roots to American eugenists who, she argued, in the 1940s had
reframed their old beliefs into new, more palatable population control ar-
guments (1974: 81-91). She portrayed postwar neo-Malthusians simply as
eugenists who broadened their horizons beyond national boundaries and
softened their rhetoric. Their goal was still to preserve "the hegemony of
the most able of the old yankees," but now by limiting the numbers and
influence of the world's nonwhite populations (Gordon 1974: 86). Bonnie
Mass analyzed the "political economy of population control" and concluded
that it was part of a strategy to preserve Western hegemony by controlling
the wombs of third world women (1972: 48-49; 1974; 1976).
These leftist feminists were not necessarily opposed to the idea of popu-
lation control, but only to the reactionary purposes to which it was put.
Gordon, for example, argued that reproduction can be controlled by the
group for the good of the group (1974: 87): "Population control may be a
reasonable part of any overall plan for economic development if it is demo-
cratically decided upon and administered." Mass (1976: 187) depicted so-
ciahst "birth planning" as a "scientific method" of determining the size of
families: "How many children a woman has is based upon her own daily
circumstances, her health, her ambitions and talents, the family's situation
and society's needs." She held up as positive models of such planning the
practices of Cuba, China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union because of their
emphasis on collective decisionmaking rather than on individual rights.
The attacks by radical feminists relied heavily on a general Marxist
critique of population control, and appear to have provoked little response
from members of the population control movement. For example, there is
no reference to these concerns in Donaldson's (1990) comprehensive his-
tory of the population control movement.^" Why were feminist criticisms
ignored? We suspect that the diversity within the feminist movement made
it possible for neo-Malthusians to listen selectively to feminist voices. Neo-
Malthusians could note that American feminists of all persuasions supported
access to reproductive control as a human right, as established in Griswold
V. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, and proposals for programs that went "be-
yond family planning" had been rejected within the population control
establishment itself. The language of the liberal feminists relating repro-
ductive control to enhanced women's status in the United States added
another rationale for population policies and programs, one that was eas-
ily translated into third world terms, especially in the context of a growing
UN interest in "Women in Development" programs (Kardam 1991). Radi-
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cal feminists could be dismissed: they spoke as outsiders, they had little
scientific legitimacy, and they attacked the collaboration between US foun-
dations and a repressive US government with anticapitalist rhetoric, thereby
limiting their political support. More generally, perhaps, feminists were not
yet considered to have the moral authority to speak for women as a cat-
egory. This was to change.
Neo-Malthusianism and feminism, 1974r-85:
A growing divide
Not only radical feminists but also third world leaders questioned the mo-
tives behind first world interest in controlling their women's fertility. The
World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974 was planned hy the
leaders of the neo-Malthusian movement to he the international confer-
ence where consensus would form around their agenda (Finkle and Crane
1975: 87-88). Third world leaders resisted, however, contending that "de-
velopment is the best contraceptive," and that increasing first world eco-
nomic development aid would he a more welcome population control strat-
egy than simply supporting fertility control programs. John D. Rockefeller
3rd used the occasion to puhlicly convert to this "developmentalist" posi-
tion (Rockefeller 1974), and soon thereafter the Population Council also
declared support for integrating all fertility control programs into compre-
hensive development programs (Population Council 1978). This was the first
of a number of challenges that neo-Malthusians faced during this decade.
Adoption of a developmentalist position was a setback for the neo-
Malthusian movement. The call for development and fertility control to
proceed together signified that international policymakers considered the
population problem to he significantly less virulent than did the neo-Malthu-
sians. Fertility control was not considered a prerequisite for development,
hut a concomitant policy intervention that simply would expedite the de-
velopment process. This constituted a significant demotion for fertility con-
trol on the international agenda of needed policy interventions. Indeed, it
gave succor to those who held that fertility decline was a consequence of
the development process and not a catalyst, and that the only way to in-
sure its occurrence was hy the indirect route of promoting development.
Such a vision of fertility decline as a necessary consequence, not cause, of
larger societal changes was to provide the frame that feminists would modify
for later use at the 1994 Cairo conference: fertility decline as a necessary
consequence of the empowerment of women. Although nothing approach-
ing this formulation of the relationship can he found in the Bucharest docu-
ment, it did call for the equal participation of women in the economic,
social, and political life of their countries, and specifically sought to in-
crease women's education.
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Another move at Bucharest had perhaps even more significant impli-
cations for relations between neo-Malthusians and feminists. At Bucharest
the international body eventually supported family planning, but the ra-
tionale was that of human rights rather than population control: "AU couples
and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the num-
ber and spacing of their children." Adopting individual-rights rhetoric nicely
deflected criticism of possible neocolonial motives for first world support of
third world population control, and few neo-Malthusians objected to it. Al-
though feminists were sparsely represented at this 1974 meeting, the position
adopted by the intemational community was consistent with the reproduc-
tive agenda of American liberal feminists.^ ' It also became the cornerstone of
future feminist attempts to influence international population policy.
If recognized as inherent, a right no longer needs to be legitimized by
reference to its social utility. Many neo-Malthusians at Bucharest promoted
an individual's right to reproductive autonomy as a pragmatic way of fur-
thering fertility control. Their advocacy, however, necessarily diminished
the legitimacy of shaping reproductive behavior to further societal inter-
ests (Demeny 1994: 8). If this individual right were recognized as absolute,
all such attempts would become positively unethical. Although the lan-
guage adopted at Bucharest melded freedom with responsibility when en-
dowing individuals with the right to determine family size, the legitimacy
of fertility reduction campaigns had begun to be questioned, and neo-Mal-
thusians had participated in that process.
Although the international community at Bucharest affirmed the right
of individuals to reproductive autonomy, during the next decade several
countries, notably India and China, initiated coercive fertility control cam-
paigns. Forced vasectomies in India and one-child campaigns that pres-
sured pregnant women to undergo late-term abortions in China were state
responses to a perceived population crisis, and these actions dismayed many.
Neo-Malthusians had worked hard to generate an aura of crisis around
population growth, and they became associated with these coercive state
actions. Although Congress did increase US government funding for inter-
national population programs, the media attention given to coercive fertil-
ity control efforts, especially those employing abortion, made American
politicians hesitant about offering unqualified support for population pro-
grams. The movement's major private sources of funds, the Rockefeller
and Ford Foundations, both significantly reduced their allocations for such
programs during this decade, thus making the movement more dependent
on public funds (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986).
Finally, neo-Malthusianism suffered an ideological setback during this
decade: a skepticism about the gravity of the population crisis grew among
both experts and the public. The Green Revolution had lessened fears of
famine, and trends in developing countries had yet to show an inverse
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relationship between population growth and per capita economic growth.
Some hegan to contend (Simon 1977) that population growth was a stimu-
lant to economic growth. In addition, and not necessarily closely associ-
ated with family planning policies and programs, declines in birth rates
also spread to a significant number of developing countries." Public alarm
over the possibility of a 'population bomb" steadily diminished after the
late 1960s (Wilmoth and Ball 1992: 635), and mass-movement neo-Malthu-
sian organizations such as Zero Population Growth (ZPG) suffered declines
in membership. The one bright spot for neo-Malthusianism was in the in-
ternational arena: the number of developing countries adopting official
antinatalist positions and implementing fertility control campaigns increased
substantially (Barrett 1995)."
The decade following Roe v. Wade was challenging for feminists and
neo-Malthusians alike. A strong "right-to-life" movement emerged in the
United States that gained political sophistication and strength. Although
not successful in their bid to outlaw abortion constitutionally, right-to-Iifers
successfully lobbied Congress in 1976 to pass the Hyde Amendment that
banned the federal funding of abortions. The National Organization for
Women and the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) coordi-
nated a unified pro-choice lobbying voice by opening an "information ex-
change" with Planned Parenthood and Zero Population Growth (Staggen-
borg 1991: 70). Abortion became perhaps the single most important symbol
for American feminists, including those in the international neo-Malthu-
sian movement. With the fading prospects of a sufficient number of states
passing the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, defending a
woman's right to abortion became the goal that unified American femi-
nists. For the first time American feminism had a core agenda that focused
on a reproductive issue. Pursuit of that agenda in the international arena
made extended engagement with neo-Malthusians likely.
The term "reproductive rights" entered the feminist lexicon during
this decade. Originally it was a counterpoint offered by leftist feminists to
"abortion rights," one aimed at questioning how narrowly defined the femi-
nist reproductive agenda should be. Leftist feminists asserted that women
have more than just a right to legally obtain an abortion; they have full
"reproductive rights" that include, in cases of need, a right to government-
subsidized abortion, contraception, prenatal care, and early childhood health
care. All women, including poor women, have the right to bear as many
children as they wish and to have their own and their children's health
needs ensured. "Right" was used in the socialist tradition, meaning an
individual's just claim to something, be it food, shelter, health care, or abor-
tion. Initially, socialist-feminists interpreted the challenge posed by the right-
to-Iife movement as part of a broader attempt by the Right to "push back
the democratic gains made by the civil rights, women's, and gay move-
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ments since the 1960s" (Clark and Wolfson 1984: 113). Their tactic was to
counter this thrust with an "offensive movement" that would seek "the
conditions for 'free choice,' including child care, national health care, high
quality education, and a guaranteed income" (Staggenborg 1991: 111).
Liberal feminists used the term "abortion rights" from within the lib-
eral tradition, meaning by "right" an individual's freedom to act without
government restriction. They had a more focused agenda than socialist-
feminists and sought a broad array of allies to help safeguard the legality of
abortion. For instance, lobbyists for NOW and ZPG worked together to de-
ter Congress from passing an antiabortion Constitutional amendment in
1973, and ZPG members were among the earliest board members of NARAL
(Staggenborg 1991: 62, 191-192); ZPG arguments held that public funding
for abortion was useful for population control agendas. By contrast, the
National Women's Health Network (NWHN), established in 1975 and one
of the earliest reproductive rights organizations, officially opposed "the use
of arguments and policies on the abortion issue which stem from an analy-
sis which suggests that population control is an element in the movement
for reproductive rights" (Staggenborg 1991: 113-114). The NWHN also de-
nounced those who sought support for public funding of abortions by ar-
guing that it would limit welfare expenditures. The continued strength of
the right-to-life movement, and its success at restricting women's access to
abortion, have worked to maintain the liberal feminist agenda of simply
protecting abortion rights. However, the more expansive term reproduc-
tive rights, divested of many of its original socialist connotations, has gained
favor among a wide spectrum of American feminists.^ '*
Actions by the more-activist women's groups to protect women's re-
productive health gained widespread support among all feminists, as evi-
denced by the enormous popularity of Our Bodies, Ourselves, a book first
published in 1971 by the Boston Women's Health Collective. The major
concern of the NWHN, for example, was placing women's interests at the
center of women's health care (Higer 1996). Physicians, medical research-
ers, pharmaceutical companies, and neo-Malthusians often had made de-
cisions about women's health issues that NWHN members believed were
not in the best interest of women. In 1977 the NWHN worked to get more-
extensive warning labels put on prescriptions of birth control pills, an ac-
tion fought by both pharmaceutical companies and neo-Malthusians (Gor-
don 1990: 422). Feminists won and pill use in the United States declined
substantially.^' Feminist groups successfully fought to block approval by
the Food and Drug Administration of Depo-Provera in 1978 and 1984,
against opposition by Upjohn, USAID, and IPPF. After the Dalkon Shield
IUD had been removed from the US market because of the high rates of
infection and sterility it caused, feminists charged (Ehrenreich, Dowie, and
Minkin 1979) that Ravenholt and USAID were dumping their supplies of
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the Shield in third world countries (Mintz 1985; Grant 1992). Some femi-
nists argued for a return to barrier methods, or even to abstinence or with-
drawal (Bram 1978; Greer 1984). Population specialists tried to normalize
the risks associated with modern contraceptives with calculations that
showed they were less than the risks associated with repeated childbear-
ing, but the women's health movement made feminists very sensitive to
issues of power and manipulation.^* The research efforts of pharmaceutical
companies and neo-Malthusians might produce more "effective" contra-
ceptives, but such improved efficiency, some feminists argued, often sim-
ply made it easier for these organizations to attain their goals without en-
hancing the reproductive rights of women.
The growing divide between the feminist reproductive agenda and
the agenda of neo-Malthusians lessened the significance of what should
have been a unifying event: the election of the economically and socially
conservative Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan, and subsequently George
Bush, provided them with a common enemy. Reagan's right-to-life posi-
tions were clear from the beginning of his presidency, and his election posed
a serious threat to the feminist pro-choice agenda. His election forestalled
implementation of the neo-Malthusian policies recommended in the Glo-
bal 2000 Report, which the US Council on Environmental Quality and the
US Department of State had delivered to President Carter in 1980," and
Reagan's anti-Malthusianism came clearly into view late in 1983 when des-
ignating the delegation that would represent the United States at the 1984
International Conference on Population in Mexico City. Any acknowledg-
ment by the United States at that conference of a serious population prob-
lem very likely would be interpreted by social conservatives as an apology
for abortion and state-mandated contraception, a position with which
Reagan did not wish to be associated during an election year (Finkle and
Crane 1985: 16-20). At Mexico City the US delegation asserted that "popu-
lation is a neutral phenomenon" in the development process, and that ex-
cessive state control of the economy was more responsible for economic
stagnation than rapid population growth. Adopting this anti-Malthusian
position undercut the rationale for fertility control programs, and allowed
the Reagan administration to oppose them and abortion. Although inspired
by domestic political considerations, this position had concrete consequences
for international neo-Malthusian efforts. After the Mexico City conference
the United States stopped funding the foreign family planning activities of
organizations that also provided abortion.
The position adopted by the Reagan administration should have fos-
tered a strong alliance between neo-Malthusians and feminists. The Reagan
amalgam of social and economic conservatism managed to reject simulta-
neously the legitimacy of a woman's right to abortion, preservation of which
was the central goal of second-wave feminism, and of population control.
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the objective of neo-Malthusianism. The administration adopted policies
that intentionally held hostage the access of millions of women to contra-
ception in order to reduce abortion. Although pushed together by these
actions, feminists and neo-Malthusians did not form an alliance. Reagan's
amalgam of conservative positions actually exposed the different repro-
ductive objectives of the two movements.
For instance, in response to the administration's positions the Popu-
lation Division of USAID protected its funding and bureaucracy not only
by isolating its family planning programs from all connection with abor-
tion services, but also by elaborating non-population control rationales for
them, designating them as components of maternal and child health pro-
grams (McPherson 1985).^ * Reproductive rights feminists objected strenu-
ously to USAID's abortion position, but viewed with some approval its dis-
play of anti-Malthusianism: "the Reagan Administration identified economic
underdevelopment as the real problem, and excessive population growth
as merely a symptom" (Dixon-Mueller 1987: 163-167). Many feminists
actively endorsed the recasting of family planning as a health program:
"Indeed, the emphasis within AID on the right of couples and families to
control their own fertility, and on maternal and child health as the major
justifications for intemational family planning assistance, provides a promis-
ing policy basis for stressing clients' needs, informed choice, and quality of
care" (Dixon-Mueller 1987: 167). Population control programs engaging in
praaices such as enticing tubal ligation candidates with incentives faced con-
certed attack by feminists (Hartmann and Standing 1985), and problems of
rapid population growth were not seen as warranting any infringement on
the reproductive autonomy of women. Few feminists, therefore, objected
to the waning of administration support for neo-Malthusianism.
Likewise, feminists could not rely on much neo-Malthusian support
in their struggle for abortion rights. Abortion, a woman's ultimate means
of controlling her reproductive destiny, was preeminently a feminist issue.
At the population level, abortion is an expensive and not especially effi-
cient means of limiting births. Neo-Malthusians, worried about cost-ben-
efit ratios, never favored abortion as a means of birth control. Sterilization,
with its permanence and limited need for motivation, held more appeal
along with the IUD and long-lasting hormonal methods such as Depo-
Provera and Norplant. Of course, the attributes that attracted neo-Malthu-
sians to these methods made feminists suspicious of them, especially steril-
ization (Shapiro 1985). Moreover, neo-Malthusians were less able to offer
assistance to feminists in the domestic political arena during the 1980s since
mass neo-Malthusian movements such as ZPG had faded considerably in
strength and no longer were a major source of pro-choice votes.
The sharing of a common enemy, therefore, did not provide a suffi-
cient foundation on which to build an alliance between feminists and neo-
Malthusians. Even so, the actions of the Reagan administration did en-
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courage renewed contact between feminists and neo-Malthusians, and gave
birth to some organizations that bridged the two movements. In 1980 the
Population Crisis Committee gave a grant to the National Women's Health
Coalition, which was reconstituted as the International Women's Health Coa-
lition (IWHC), to promote menstrual regulation and early-term abortion in
developing countries. The IWHC, started with neo-Malthusian money, be-
came the major source of support and training for third world providers of
abortion. Soon it expanded its agenda and attempted to construct a firmer
foundation for an alliance between feminists and neo-Malthusians.
Neo-Malthusianism and feminism, 1985-95:
An alliance is assembled
The story of the neo-Malthusian movement in this final period of analysis
is largely a continuation of the trends since Bucharest: growing interna-
tional strength, hut domestic weakening. By 1991, 69 countries had offi-
cially endorsed comprehensive population policies (Barrett 1995: 249). Fam-
ily planning programs continued to receive international funding, but an
increasing proportion of funding was provided by third world governments
themselves, indicating a growing neo-Malthusian commitment on their part.
Domestically there was a steady erosion of institutional support for neo-
Malthusianism. Neo-Malthusians were asked for solid evidence that rapid
population growth had significant negative effects on development poten-
tial. Such evidence had become more ambiguous, and the received wis-
dom of neo-Malthusians faced serious challenge on many fronts, from the
opposition of the Religious Right to the skepticism of academics. A report
by the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 1986)
seriously weakened development rationales for population programs. Cold
War fears had generated a good deal of political support for population
reduction efforts for 40 years, but the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War dissipated this powerful source of neo-Malthusian
support. Additionally, in the post-Cold War context the development ar-
gument for population control, at least for Northern policymakers, devolved
into a humanitarian argument: population control will enhance the wel-
fare of Southern individuals. Benefits that might accrue to the North from
reducing Southern rates of population growth could be suggested: perhaps
fertility reduction, by enhancing rates of economic growth in the South, would
eventually lessen Southern emigration to the North or enhance South/North
trade. These benefits, however, lacked immediacy and credibility. Altru-
ism promised to provide a much shakier foundation for support for neo-
Malthusianism than fear of communism. The withdrawal of US executive
branch backing for neo-Malthusianism elicited no revival of foundation
support, and some old-line population officers in foundations were replaced
by ones more attuned to feminist concerns.^'
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The extent and pace of fertility decline had increased. Although these
fertility declines could he interpreted as evidence of the past success of fer-
tility control programs, they also lessened the salience of population con-
trol on the international agenda. Demographic accounts told in terms of
age composition and population momentum are technical, and much less
capable of capturing the public imagination than the earlier projections of
rapid population growth—with third world curves soaring upward much
more steeply than those for the first world. Many neo-Malthusians believed
that simply "satisfying existing demand for family planning" would bring
further substantial declines, and population projections made during this
period invariably assumed a continued decline in Southern population
growth rates (Westoff 1994: 30, 32). Population policy became focused on
reducing the ultimate size of the world's population by hastening the pace
of fertility decline. Social problems compete for attention and funds
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988), and in this competition for salience popula-
tion control issues lost while global environmental issues gained.
Neo-Malthusians reacted to declining interest by reshaping their agen-
da and, much as Sanger had done, by pragmatically casting around for pos-
sible allies. The environmental movement seemed an obvious source of
support, given that one strand of explanation for environmental problems
emphasized population growth (Crane 1993: 367-369): "Reducing popu-
lation growth was readily incorporated into the concept of 'sustainable de-
velopment,' which became the common aspiration of the environmental
and development communities during the 1980s...." Prestigious scientific
bodies such as the Royal Society of London and the US National Academy
of Sciences issued statements (1992) linking current rates of population
grovi^ h with "irreversible degradation of the environment." The senior vice
president of Population Action International (formerly Population Crisis
Committee) wrote in Foreign Policy that the next decade was the last chance
to stabilize population "through humane and voluntary measures" (Camp
1993: 126). The director of Population Sciences at the Rockefeller Founda-
tion testified to Congress that if governments do not adopt "voluntary and
humane policies" to slow population growth in the present, it "can lead to
a requirement in the future to try to control population growth rates in
more Draconian ways" (Sinding 1994). Senator Al Gore published Earth in
the Balance, declaring that "no goal is more crucial to healing the global
environment than stabilizing human population" (1992: 307). These ef-
forts to rejuvenate the population issue met with mixed success, and the
neo-Malthusian effort to forge an alliance with the environmental move-
ment was actively contested by feminists.
Women meeting in Rio de Janeiro in preparation for the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development objected vigorously and suc-
cessfully to including population as a cause of environmental degradation
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(Cohen 1993). Two days of discussion on population were held at the
Women's Tent outside the UNCED meetings, and population control was
roundly attacked. The final Rio Declaration on environment and develop-
ment contained only oblique mention of population.'" Even so, some femi-
nists feared that neo-Malthusians using aggregate environmental arguments
would oppose their attempt to fashion a conference document unequivo-
cally guaranteeing the reproductive rights of individual women at the Pre-
paratory Committee meetings preceding Cairo. This did not happen.'' By
the third Preparatory Committee Meeting for Cairo (PrepCom III) Susan
Davis of the Women's Environment and Development Organization ob-
served (1994): "the environmental constituency worked closely with the
women's caucus; they coordinated their inputs." Apparently environmen-
talists, concerned with furthering their broad agenda, did not wish to alien-
ate feminists hy appearing to support any intrusion on women's reproduc-
tive rights. Nor did they wish to weaken ties with friends in the South who
objected to blaming environmental degradation on the prolificness of the
poor rather than on the overconsumption of the rich.
The new alliance that came to sustain the neo-Malthusian movement
was with feminists, and was indeed largely initiated by feminists. Begin-
ning in the mid-1980s, a network of feminists committed to improving
women's reproductive health "played an increasingly influential role both
in shaping the terms of the policy debate and re-orienting the population
agendas of major international institutions" (Higer 1996: 1)." They drew
on the values expressed in the reproductive rights agenda that had been
articulated in the abortion debates, particularly its human rights rationale.
Unlike either the suffragists of the early years of the century or USAID in
the Reagan-Bush years, both of which emphasized women as mothers,
the reproductive health feminists envisioned women in a wide spectrum
of social roles, a more expansive identity. They also drew on a wider femi-
nist network, in part a consequence of more women attaining positions in
foundations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and interna-
tional agencies." An inclusive ideology that valued wide participation and
consensus-building produced an international network that included sig-
nificant Southern representation.'*
The International Women's Health Coalition took the lead in formu-
lating a feminist position that made the alliance at Cairo possible, although
its ideological frames, tactics, and influence owe much to previous devel-
opments in feminism as a social movement. In 1984 Joan Dunlop became
president and Adrienne Germain vice president of the IWHC." Shortly
thereafter its agenda expanded to include areas of women's reproductive
health other than menstrual regulation and abortion, the initial focus of
IWHC, and their funding sources shifted from the Population Crisis Com-
mittee to the Hewlett, Mellon, Ford, and MacArthur Foundations.'* Much
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as the neo-Malthusian movement had done earlier, the IWHC aimed to
change state policy, particularly that of USAID, the Department of State, and
the United Nations. Dunlop thought conditions were opportune for moving
population policy in more feminist directions (Hartmann 1987: 295):
The threat of AIDS, which is renewing interest in barrier methods, and the
right-wing attack on family planning, which is encouraging liberal elements
in the population establishment to seek allies among the feminist commu-
nity, make this an historic opening for those of us who want to make repro-
duaive rights the new cornerstone of population policy.
USAID's recasting of family planning activities into maternal and child
health activities suggested that the agency's program might be further trans-
formed into a women's reproductive health program. This "reproductive
health approach" was elaborated by Germain in a 1987 paper, "Reproduc-
tive health and dignity: Choices by third world women." Looking hack on
this paper from the perspective of May 1994, Germain (1994) said.
The vision . . . now is a more encompassing vision. Back in '87 about the
only thing we could really do would be to suggest that the different pieces—
MCH [maternal and child health], child survival, family planning—become
more integrated. Seven years later we can write a vision which is much more
encompassing and is actually well-reflected in the ICPD document.
Germain's 1987 paper listed the constituencies that might be approached
for alliances, including "population professionals who want both to increase
the number of contraceptive users and to support their continuing use for
substantial enough periods to have both demographic and health effects."'^
To woo these constituencies, the IWHC leaders had two tasks. First, they
had to develop a feminist population policy that would satisfy a wide vari-
ety of feminists. Second, they had to mobilize support for this policy from
the neo-Malthusian establishment.
Between 1987 and 1994 the IWHC articulated an "ideological pack-
age" that melded its own commitment to safeguarding and improving
women's reproductive health with specific issues raised by feminists over
the past 20 years. An early step was to reframe the concept of "unmet
need." Demographers measure unmet need as the proportion of married
women who say they want to stop childbearing or delay the birth of the
next child but who are not currently using contraception (Westoff 1988;
Bongaarts 1990, 1991). The existence of a significant proportion of such
women provides justification for further family planning efforts (Sinding
1993). In Germain's 1987 paper unmet need was expanded to include wom-
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en, such as the unmarried, currently excluded from services. By 1994, how-
ever, feminists engaged in the effort to influence the Cairo Program of Ac-
tion were using the term in a far more expansive fashion, one evocative of
Emma Goldman, the early Margaret Sanger, and leftist-feminists calling
for positive rights in the 1970s (Abzug 1994):
So, what should we emphasize in Cairo? First, we must collectively address
the challenge of how to meet the real unmet demand and need of billions of
people for simple human dignity and basic human rights. How do we meet
the unmet demand and need by the female half of our population for power
over their lives, for control over their bodies, for physical and emotional se-
curity, for education and economic independence that enables the realiza-
tion of one's human potential? And how do we meet the unmet consump-
tion demand and need for food, for shelter, for education, for jobs, for health
care?
In March 1993 the IWHC, acting as international secretariat, began
circulating for signatures a policy statement, "Women's Voices '94" (Inter-
national Women's Health Coalition 1993), aimed at insuring that women
would be "heard" during the preparations for the International Confer-
ence on Population and Development in Cairo. "Women's Voices '94" illus-
trates how the ideological package of the international reproductive rights
feminists was reframed after 1987. It includes the aims set out by Germain
in her 1987 paper to improve and expand delivery of family planning ser-
vices,'* but adds opposition to any form of coercion (such as the offering of
incentives), advocates women organizing and running all programs pro-
viding health services for women, and calls for "equal rights legislation" to
insure women better access to education, employment, and credit. Both
liberal feminist concerns with gender equality and radical feminist con-
cerns with the aholishment of patriarchy are addressed, suggesting a vari-
ety of influences from second-wave feminism. Over 2,200 individuals even-
tually signed the statement."
The expansion of the feminist population agenda facilitated alliances
with a wider range of feminists than had been possible before. The more
visible of these allies during the preparations for Cairo was the Women's
Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), a New York-based
group led by former Congresswoman Bella Abzug. Among the resources
offered hy WEDO was the mobilization of support by Southern women. In
November 1991 WEDO organized a "World Women's Congress for a
Healthy Planet" in Miami attended by some 1,500 women from 83 coun-
tries, a mobilization that enhanced WEDO's presence at the Rio UNCED
conference during June 1992. Whereas IWHC's tactics were to work in the
corridors of power, WEDO's tactics were more reminiscent of the grass-
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roots collective action developed by the new social movements of the late
1960s and 1970s. Susan Davis, executive director of WEDO, described
(1994) what has become the group's technique for representing women's
interests at UN conferences:
It is a methodology to organize lots of people's energies for a "common
ground" advocacy and to influence the process. It requires an understanding
of the UN process and where the points of leverage are Women a decade
ago wouldn't have understood that. It wasn't widely understood. It is now.
And there wasn't a concerted effort to harness lots of voices.
Harnessing "lots of voices" was an implicit challenge to the white male
neo-Malthusian establishment continuing to decide what was best for third
world women. The tactic, however, posed problems for IWHC leaders who
wanted to work with that establishment to plan for Cairo. Many of the
Southern women at the UNCED meetings were actively hostile to all talk
of population problems, and had displayed a willingness to confront openly
those who thought otherwise."" A repeat of the UNCED Women's Tent anti-
Malthusian display at Cairo was not what moderate reproductive health
activists wanted. The Ford Foundation gave funds to the IWHC to bring
together in January 1994 over 200 women activists, many with radical
leanings, to see whether a unified Cairo strategy could be forged. Five days
of meetings in Rio de Janeiro produced a "Rio Statement" on reproductive
health and justice (International Women's Health Coalition 1994) that was
notably more anti-population control than the original "Women's Voices
'94" statement, even observing that "a significant number of the partici-
pants opposed population policies as being inherently coercive."'*' It de-
clared "unanimous opposition to designing fertility control measures or
population polides specifically targeted at Southern countries," and explicitly
questioned the safety of non-barrier methods of contraception. But, in the
end, the participants did agree that women should come to PrepCom III
and Cairo with a united voice and work to effect change within the limits
of conference procedures.
An overt dismissal of the population problem could not be incorpo-
rated into a "common ground" position that was to serve as a basis for an
alliance between feminists and neo-Malthusians. Although crisis rhetoric
had diminished, neo-Malthusianism had not died. Prestigious journals such
as Science were publishing articles with neo-Malthusian conclusions: "there
is broad agreement that reduction in rapid population growth in the de-
veloping world will enhance the prospects for improved living standards of
additional billions in the decades ahead" (Bongaarts 1994: 771). And some
academics (Kelley and Schmidt 1994) were discovering evidence of nega-
tive correlation between aggregate population growth and per capita out-
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put growth for the 1980s. Likewise, a policy that explicitly attempted to
lower the fertility of individual women also could not he incorporated into
a common ground position, since feminists would object. A policy with
which both feminists and the neo-Malthusian establishment could live
needed to be devised as Cairo approached. Steven Sinding, of the Rocke-
feller Foundation, suggested abolishing all demographic targets and hav-
ing programs that solely attempted to "meet the unmet need" of women
for family planning (1993; Sinding, Ross, and Rosenfield 1994). His analy-
sis of survey data indicated that every country's fertility targets would be
reached if women attained their own fertility goals. Earlier Marge Berer,
editor of Reproductive Health Matters, had called on women's health activists
to "acknowledge that the world cannot sustain an unlimited number of
people," and then urged them to become a major force in formulating popu-
lation policies: "I would argue that women have a right to judge popula-
tion policies as being acceptable or not, according to whether or not they
meet women's needs and promote women's interests" (1991: 3). An ad-
vertisement placed hy the IWHC in the New York Times (10 May 1993) made
the connection between women as population actors and population poli-
cymakers, while also acknowledging that there was a problem in need of
solutions: "Who is better qualified to come up with solutions than the
women at the heart of the matter? No one." Such claims would have had
little impact hefore second-wave feminism, but after three decades of femi-
nist consciousness-raising in US society they had achieved a moral legiti-
macy that was difficult to dismiss.
Ruth Dixon-Mueller (1993) and others (Sen, Germain, and Chen
1994) constructed an elaborate and finely aligned "feminist population
policy" within which feminist objectives were congruent with the interests
of the neo-Malthusian movement. There were three crucial aspects of
Dixon-Mueller's formulation. First, "population stabilization" was presented
as a desirable ultimate goal, although not one warranting the use of com-
pulsion. Second, national programs enhancing access to contraception were
justified in terms of individual human rights, not in terms of their devel-
opment advantages for aggregate populations. This shift, signaled earlier at
Bucharest, allowed feminists to draw on the powerful symbolic human
rights language embedded in UN rhetoric for decades to argue for the rec-
ognition of reproductive rights. Third, in an argument reminiscent of the
one made at Bucharest that "development is the best contraceptive," the
empowerment of women was presented as a prerequisite for the enduring
low fertility that population stabilization requires. In this ideological pack-
age feminists reject hoth the legitimacy and the effectiveness of current
efforts to induce women to have fewer children, arguing that only hy re-
dressing gender inequity and scrupulously respecting each woman's re-
productive rights can lasting low fertility be achieved. Programmatically,
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this meant that family planning services should be provided within the
context of comprehensive reproductive health programs that had enhanc-
ing health, not lowering fertility, as their fundamental objective. Only within
such programs could contraception be provided to women without the ap-
pearance of manipulation.
This "common ground" population position was framed to accommo-
date many parties, including representatives of organizations that had
strongly supported neo-Malthusian initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s. It
worked. Joseph Speidel, president of Population Aaion International, ob-
served (Greene 1994: 7): "there is growing recognition that there's a tre-
mendous amount of common ground among what's been loosely called
the health advocates, coming from a more feminist perspective, and tradi-
tional family planners, who come from more of a demography, environ-
ment, and development perspective.""^ Steven Sinding testified (4 August
1994) hefore Congress that along with the provision of reproductive health
services, "investments in the empowerment of women, particularly through
education," are needed to bring about fertility decline. Lewis Preston, presi-
dent of the World Bank, issued (6 September 1994) a three-part "Call to
Action" that entailed improving women's access to health care and educa-
tion as well as to family planning services. Even nongovernmental organi-
zations that were focused on population control, such as Zero Population
Growth and the Population Institute, incorporated much of the rhetoric in
their public positions. Susan Davis of WEDO noted (1994) that by PrepCom
III, ZPG actually "coordinated their inputs with us."
An alliance with feminists had aspects that appealed to neo-Malthu-
sians. It came with a preexisting constituency, one that had been among
the most vocal critics of the population control movement. Also, within
this new framework justification for population control no longer rested
on the changing theories and inconstant analyses of economists and ecolo-
gists. In fact, the familiar correlations of women's education with lower
fertility were the only "hard data" many needed to document the claim
that women's empowerment would lead to population stabilization. In the
climate of the 1990s, ensuring women's reproductive health rights did not
need even this empirical "proof" of its population control efficacy, much as
an earlier generation of neo-Malthusians had not initially needed demon-
stration of the link between development and population control. If im-
proving women's access to education or to reproductive health services
did not result in dramatic fertility reductions, these endeavors would nev-
ertheless be seen as intrinsically valuable. For feminists, at any rate, the
salience of gender equity was viscerally felt.
The neo-Malthusian movement's shifting alliances played themselves
out in a condensed version after the election of President Bill Clinton in
1992. Upon assuming office he immediately rescinded Reagan's "Mexico
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City" policy. He restored financing to IPPF and the United Nations Popula-
tion Fund, adopted an unequivocal pro-choice position, and rejected the
idea that population growth was "a neutral phenomenoti" in the develop-
ment process. He appointed Timothy E. Wirth Counselor at the State De-
partment and the administration's main spokesman on population policy,
and put him in charge of preparing for the Cairo cotiference. A former Sena-
tor from Colorado, Wirth had a reputation as an environmentalist who would
strongly advocate population control as a means of restoring ecological bal-
ance. He soon discovered, however, that in the 1990s one had to be very
careful when mixing neo-Malthusianism, environmentalism, and feminism.
The reproductive health feminists initially found Wirth "to be coming
to this issue from an environmental concern" (Germain 1994) and spent
the next year educating him about an expansive view of population issues
that recognized the importance of delivering family planning services within
a broader context of reproductive health and that emphasized the major
role played by the empowerment of women in fertility decline. Wirth even-
tually converted. He asserted (ICFD 94 1994) at a March 1994 UN meeting
that "sustainable development cannot be realized without the full engage-
ment and complete empowermetit of women," and noted that "women's
empowerment, rights and well-being" were "top priorities for the Clinton
administration." He ratified essentially feminist goals for the Cairo confer-
ence: "meeting the unmet demand for and expanding the range of repro-
ductive health services"; "investing in the wisdom of women"; respecting
"the basic human rights of women"; ensuring that "women have neces-
sary economic rights"; adaptitig population programs "to address the unique
problems faced by adolescetit girls"; and involving women "in the design and
implementation of sustainable development strategies and programmes."
By the time delegates met at the 1994ICPD meeting in Cairo, a group
of American reproductive health feminists had been successful in uniting a
large bloc of feminists and much of the population establishment behind
the carefully constructed "common ground" agenda."' The Program of Ac-
tion adopted at Cairo was the contract outlining the terms of a new alli-
ance: redressing gender inequities is needed for lasting fertility control, and
women have reproductive rights to freely determine their reproductive des-
tinies. Both government and foundation components of the US neo-Malthu-
sian establishment signed on, as did some UN members whose feminist
credentials might be considered dubious. Although we had expected Cairo
would be a battleground where feminists and neo-Malthusians would fight
over framing the world's population agenda for the coming decades, a mea-
sure of the alliance's success was that only soothing words of agreement
passed between the two new allies, who found themselves comrades in
arms in a fierce battle with a Vatican delegation intent upon cleansing the
Program of Action of any endorsement of abortion. The Vatican assumed
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that Americans largely shaped the Conference's agenda—an assumption
shared by the Conference's secretary general (Sadik 1996): "it was Ameri-
can leadership above all which drove the Cairo process along"—and made
a concerted effort to influence the US position."" The press highlighted ev-
ery skirmish in this battle, but hardly noticed the lack of conflict that sur-
rounded the retraction of population concerns from that document. Al-
though some conservative groups, such as the American Heritage
Foundation, had come prepared to debate the existetice of a "population
problem," they found virtually no one with whom to argue. The absence
of neo-Malthusian rhetoric in the Program of Action, in formal statements,
or even in hallway discussions, made Cairo seem more a conference on
feminism than one on population stabilization."'
Neo-Malthusianism and feminism after Cairo:
A lasting alliance?
Historically, alliances between American neo-Malthusians and feminists have
lasted when the two sodal movements agreed on certain ideological premises,
shared a common demographic goal, and perceived mutual benefit in the alli-
ance. The alliances entered into by Margaret Sanger's birth controllers and
eugenists during the 1920s, and by planned parenthood advocates and neo-
Malthusians after World War n each possessed these characteristics, and each
lasted well over a decade. One way to assess the likely durability of the cur-
rent alliance, then, is to examine the extent to which the two parties agree on
ideological premises, share goals, and perceive mutual benefit in the alliance.
Shared ideology?
In the 1920s birth controllers and eugenists shared a conviction that ben-
efits would follow if the "less fit" had fewer children. In the 1950s popula-
tion specialists and planned parenthood advocates shared neo-Malthusian
beliefs in the benefits of low fertility. Shared ideology fostered the trust
that allowed actions to be coordinated and misunderstandings to be nego-
tiated. Is there a shared ideology that unites contemporary neo-Malthu-
sians and feminists? Our answer is no.
The major ideological divide has been clearly identified by both femi-
nists and neo-Malthusians. For instance, at PrepCom III Bella Abzug,
WEDO's president, explicitly called on all parties to repudiate neo-Malthu-
sian ends and adopt feminist ones (1994):
We must ask the means-end question because the rhetoric in this document
is better and better. But have the ends changed? Have we achieved a new
shared understanding that populationist ends are the wrong end? Is women's
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equality a fundamental end, in and of itself? Or is the only reason any gov-
ernment or international agency now spends an additional dollar to educate
a girl simply to persuade her to have fewer children? Are these concessions
to 'women's empowerment' just more carrots?
Charles Westoff (1995: 15) agreed that the ends remained different: "The
[ICPD] conference was a resounding success for the advocates of women's
reproductive health but a disappointment to many concerned about popu-
lation growth. And the two are not synonymous." Malcolm Potts (1995: 4)
pointed to the same ideological divide that Abzug saw: "women's advo-
cates rather reluctantly accepted expressions of concern over population
growth into the Cairo document," and when considering fertility control
they "often implied that success is impossible without coercion."
No neo-Malthusian openly attacked the gender equity goals of the
feminists, and few were as intrepid as Potts and Westoff in risking the wrath
of the reproductive rights feminists by questioning the common ground
agenda. The lack of overt opposition actually aroused feminist suspicions.
Elizabeth McGrory, a feminist who has worked on population issues at the
Ford and MacArthur Foundations, grew wary after PrepCom III victories
(1994): "Is it actually succeeding, or are they co-opting our language and
kind of lulling us into a false sense of security when in fact they are not
going to do any of this? They' being the white, male, population control
establishment." Meanwhile other feminists, especially those who stood out-
side the common ground, carried forth the radical feminist critique of popu-
lation control initiated by Gordon and Mass in the 1970s. Betsy Hartmann
accused "the population control establishment" of consciously incorporat-
ing "the language of women's rights into its technocratic lexicon" as an
"expedient" measure "to hypass the more politically sensitive issues of race
and class." She noted that "to reduce population growth, they are willing
to call for the education of women, for example, but not for land reform,
the redistribution of economic and political power, or the repudiation of
international debt" (Hartmann 1990:45^6).** Radical feminists abroad ech-
oed these concerns: "Reproductive rights," Akhter asserted (1992: 5), "is
nothing but the slogan for population control in disguise," and all popula-
tion control "is based on eugenic, racist, sexist, and exploitative actions
against certain races and classes of people." She wondered, "how can femi-
nists take part in such exploitative poUcy?""^
In truth, many of the internationally oriented American feminists who
participated in forming this alliance are overt anti-Malthusians. When a
movement's purported ally can publicly ask it to repudiate its basic belief
system at an international conference called to deal with that movement's
agenda, as Bella Abzug did, it seems fair to say that there is little true shar-
ing of ideology.
506 FEMINISTS AND NEO-MALTHUSIANS
Common goals?
The goals of contemporary neo-Malthusians and feminists derive from their
ideologies. American neo-Malthusians wish to lower fertility so as to re-
duce population growth and thereby foster prosperity. American feminists
wish to enhance the control each woman has over her reproduction as a
means to gender equity and gender equality. The Cairo alliance finesses
this disagreement over goals with a clever "common ground" agenda that
fabricates a set of common goals. Both parties commit themselves to two
provisions: a gender equity strategy for attaining population stabilization,
and respect for the right of each woman to freely determine her fertility.
Only within this artfully arranged set of common goals are the two move-
ments compatible. But if either party comes to feel unduly constrained hy
this agenda, the alliance is likely to flounder.
The first provision of the "common ground" agenda, adopting a gen-
der equity strategy for attaining population stabilization, presents the neo-
Malthusian with a significant problem: identifying a difficult-to-accomplish
"means" as being the movement's principal way of attaining its desired
end. If restructuring gender roles is slow to happen, neo-Malthusians will
be tempted to seek alternative means of inducing fertility decline. If fertil-
ity decline occurs unaccompanied hy significant changes in gender rela-
tions, as has happened in the past, neo-Malthusians will be tempted to
stop working to end gender inequities. Either action is likely to rupture
the alliance with feminists.
Neo-Malthusians also face problems if they abide with the "common
ground" position's second provision, recognizing an inviolate right of each
woman to freely determine her fertility. A genuine adoption of a repro-
ductive rights framework entails forgetting decades of neo-Malthusian ide-
ology. If an individual woman has "an absolute right to bodily integrity
and to decide herself on matters of sexuality and childbearing with no in-
terference from her partner, family, health care professionals, religious
groups, the state, or any other actor" (Boland, Rao, and Zeidenstein 1994:
100), then any attempt to persuade her, with words or incentives, of the
benefits of a small family would be inappropriate. Acceptance of this sec-
ond provision might even inhibit neo-Malthusians from asserting the effi-
cacy of birth control activities at the societal level. Might feminists con-
strue, for example, lobbying for special funds for family planning activities
as an infringement of reproductive rights, or a departure from the gender
equity route to fertility decline? If their alliance with feminists keeps neo-
Malthusians from publicly proclaiming the efficacy of lowering fertility, they
ultimately may be compelled to choose between preserving this alliance
and preserving their movement.
If feminists accept as legitimate any infringement on reproductive au-
tonomy, neo-Malthusians can much more easily justify their attempts to
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influence individual fertility decisions directly. But situations are arising,
hoth domestically and internationally, that are testing the depth of femi-
nist dedication to reproductive rights. Domestically, a numher of "welfare
reform" initiatives have been initiated that purposely restrict taxpayer sup-
port for unwed teenage mothers in order to reduce out-of-wedlock births.
Feminists have mobilized surprisingly little opposition to this ohvious in-
fringement of their concept of reproductive autonomy. This muted response
suggests superfidal support for reproductive rights among middle-class femi-
nists. With their own family-size decisions constrained by economic con-
siderations, many might accept the notion that one should have only the
children for whom one can provide. As such proposals become law with
minimal protest, neo-Malthusians are in a position to draw obvious analo-
gies: efforts to control the fertility of overseas populations receiving signifi-
cant aid from US taxpayers are justifiable. Internationally, the practice of
many couples aborting female fetuses in order to give birth to more sons
has made it difficult for any feminist to absolutely support the individual's
reproductive autonomy. Although reproductive rights feminists theoreti-
cally are opposed to any form of coercion, they worked hard to include in
the Program of Action (4.23) a call for state intervention to stop such pre-
natal sex selection. The document offers no reason why individuals should
not be able to choose the sex of their offspring. The stated objection to
current practice is found in the gender imhalance of aborted fetuses, not in
the practice itself.** Such apparent approval of reproductive coercion to
accomplish feminist gender-equity goals makes it less than obvious why
reproductive coercion to accomplish the development goals of neo-Malthu-
sians should be considered necessarily unethical.
Finally, both parties to this alliance live in a culture that accepts the
importance of evidence produced by positivist science, and much of the
"common ground" agenda rests on a less than firm scientific basis. Demog-
raphers (McNicoll 1994: 659; Cleland 1996: 110), for example, know of
numerous counter-examples to the empirical generalization on which the
Program of Action's population stabilization program is founded: that gen-
der equity is a prerequisite of low fertility. Neo-Malthusians, who had never
lost faith in the efficacy of their fertility control programs, now find them-
selves resting their movement's fate on a questionable empirical proposi-
tion. Likewise, feminists have taken an anti-Malthusian stance for a quar-
ter-century and are very familiar with the empirical studies whose findings
question the link between rapid population growth and stagnant economic
growth. Their acquiescence to the Program of Action's goal of population
stahilization, therefore, does not derive from any empirical judgment that
such a stabilization would improve the circumstances of Southern women.
Adrienne Germain of the IWHC admits as much (1994): "Our constitu-
ency includes, probably by far the majority, those who really don't think it
[population] is a problem." Real questions exist, then, both about the ex-
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tent to which the "common ground" agenda incorporates the true goals of
each movement, and about the level of each movement's commitment to that
agenda. If population stabilization is achieved without greater gender equity,
feminists cannot be cotmted on to celehrate. If greater gender equity is secured
wdthout fertility decline, neo-Malthusians cannot he assured of applauding.
Mutual benefit?
In the 1920s eugenists appreciated a birth control ally that could market
contraception to the lower classes as a way to improve health and wellbe-
ing, and birth controllers appreciated the scientific credentials that a eugenist
ally could lend to the cause of legalizing access to contraception. In the
1950s population specialists appreciated the optimism and fervor that
planned parenthood advocates brought to their efforts, and planned par-
enthood advocates appreciated the global networks and resources of their
ally. With real mutual benefits, both parties were motivated to preserve
and strengthen their alliance. What, then, are the mutual benefits in the
current alliance between neo-Malthusians and feminists?
Leaving aside help in attaining broad feminist goals such as investing
in women or ensuring women's economic rights, reproductive health femi-
nists have a specific agenda: to improve existing maternal and child health
programs, including family planning; to include unmarried women and
adolescents as clients; to establish programs to prevent and treat reproduc-
tive tract infections, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and hreast cancer;
to provide access to abortion; to discourage female genital mutilation; and
to educate for a satisfying sex life (Dixon-Mueller 1993: 207; Program of
Action: 7.6). They have two ways of attaining these specific goals: generat-
ing de novo their own stream of funding and establishing a service delivery
structure in collaboration with Southern governments, as the neo-Malthu-
sians had done in previous decades; or piggy-backing on the funding, bureau-
cracies, and clinics of the neo-Malthusian movement. The latter strategy is
attractive because the population movement's resources and institutional
structures are substantial. From the point of view of the reproductive health
feminists, then, an alliance with neo-Malthusians has much to offer.
What do neo-Malthusians want from this alliance? There seem to be
few material benefits for neo-Malthusians in an alliance that redirects sig-
nificant amounts of their funds and institutional power to reproductive
health feminists. Speaking in May 1994, Germain noted this pragmatic con-
cern of neo-Malthusians: "There is a fear, there is a real threat now, there
is a demand that we want to do something different with their money."
Some neo-Malthusians see an ideological benefit flowing from an alliance
wdth feminists. Reframing family planning programs as reproductive health
programs, and population control programs as gender equity programs, pro-
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vides a more "politically correct" rationale for fertility control. Alternatively,
the political clout of feminism has made it difficult for neo-Malthusians to
rebuff overt feminist attempts to reframe population policy without open-
ing themselves up to charges of being sexists, an epithet few wish to en-
dure these days.
Any consideration of benefits also must examine risks. There are ma-
terial risks for neo-Malthusians in collaborating with feminists. If public
support for the reproductive rights of Southern women is insufficient to
motivate Northern donors to fund new reproductive health services and
keep appropriations for family planning at current levels, then funds avail-
able for family planning may actually decline."' If antifeminist sentiment
gains strength, perhaps in conjunction with Presidential or Congressional
elections, then neo-Malthusians could see their interests politically threat-
ened hy this alliance. In January 1996 a group of abortion opponents in
the House of Representatives managed to cut the population and family
planning budget of USAID for fiscal year 1996 to only 14 percent of fiscal
year 1995 expenditures. These representatives wanted a reinstatement of
the Reagan-Bush restrictions on US-funded groups using private money
or money provided by other governments for abortion-related activities.
To the extent that preserving pro-choice options in international family
planning programs is primarily a feminist concern, neo-Malthusians expe-
rienced in a dramatic fashion the costs of an alliance with feminists (Potts
1996). Although the 1996 elections weakened Congressional antiabortion
forces and ended the "embargo" on international family planning funds,
the future is uncertain. If neo-Malthusians were unencumbered hy alli-
ance with feminists, their ability to negotiate with social conservatives would
he enhanced.'"
There are ideological risks for feminists in an alliance with neo-Malthu-
sians. To the extent this alliance is a pragmatic move hy feminists to redi-
rect some of the population establishment's resources to women's health
programs by playing on the Malthusian fears of rich nations (Germain 1994),
then "common ground" feminists should acknowledge the seriousness of
the population problem simply to sustain the flow of funds. Yet such an
acknowledgment portends movement discord. Radical feminists have al-
ways offered broad interpretations of North/South, rich/poor, and male/
female relationships that identify differential power as the major source of
mistreatment and hardship. They see overpopulation explanations of pov-
erty as attrihuting the plight of poor women to their own actions. "Com-
mon ground" feminists, therefore, find themselves pulled in different di-
rections by a desire for resources and by a worry over movement discord.
They must he Malthusian enough to effectively solicit funds, but anti-
Malthusian enough to preserve ties with more radical feminists, hoth at
home and abroad, who remain staunch opponents of population control.
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The cost and benefit ledger of this alliance for each movement is still
indecipherable. Only after a number of funding decisions are made will it
be clear whether mutual benefits are associated with this alliance. Pres-
ently, its mutually heneficial character is suspect. If Northern funding for
reproductive health services is not forthcoming, feminists are likely to seek
movement unity and retake the anti-Malthusian high ground. If close ties
with feminists and the abortion issue significantly reduce the level of funds
available for fertility control programs, neo-Malthusians are likely to begin
distancing themselves from feminist positions.
Conclusion
Neo-Malthusians, and those who seek to influence population trends gen-
erally, are neither natural allies of feminists nor natural enemies: much
depends on the circumstances of the moment. The birth control move-
ment under Margaret Sanger and her successors was clearly a feminist en-
deavor, one asserting that a woman's ability to control her reproduction
was a prerequisite for women's equality. It formed sturdy alliances first
with the eugenists in the 1920s, and then, when eugenics came into disre-
pute, with neo-Malthusians in the 1950s. These alliances were based on
shared ideological beliefs and demographic goals, and were perceived to be
mutually heneficial. In the 1980s, however, American feminists encoun-
tered an American neo-Malthusian movement diminished in power and
influence, and fashioned a one-sided "common ground" agenda that pro-
duced an alliance of questionable mutual benefit. Based on a fabricated
unity of interests that neither movement finds convincing, this agenda is
unlikely to bind together two movements that share few ideological beliefs
and possess no clear common goals. Our historical analysis suggests that
the contemporary alliance hetween American neo-Malthusians and Ameri-
can feminists is a fragile one, unlikely to endure any change in circumstance.
One change, however, might work to maintain this alliance into the
twenty-first century: the growth and consolidation of global society. Al-
though our account of the formulation of the Program of Action empha-
sized the preeminent role assumed by Northern, especially American, par-
ticipants, we believe that at future conferences on population, power will
move from the North to the South. Southern countries are no longer pas-
sive recipients of population control largess; many now fund a substantial
majority of their own reproductive health services. In most Southern coun-
tries a different dynamic exists hetween national neo-Malthusian and femi-
nist movements than exists in the United States. Many Southern govern-
ments are currently staffed with officials who hold strong neo-Malthusian
beliefs. Malawi and China (Malawi Government 1995; Chinese Govern-
ment 1996), for example, recently adopted unreconstructed population con-
DENNIS HODGSON / SUSAN COTTS WATKINS 511
trol documents. Feminism is generally less well established in Southern
countries, especially outside the capital cities. If Southern officials find that
pragmatically relabeling family planning programs as "reproductive health
programs" and AIDS prevention programs as "sexual health programs" in-
duces donors to fund their requests for assistance, then strong international
support for the Program of Action might develop. A "common ground"
agenda that pragmatically works to fulfill the material needs of highly placed
Southern neo-Malthusians and the ideological needs of influential North-
ern feminists might also work to keep alive a fragile domestic alliance be-
tween unequal partners.
Notes
Versions of this article were presented at the
1996 Population Association of America
Meeting and the 1995 Social Science History
Association Meeting. We are grateful for
comments from Deborah Barrett, for conver-
sations with Jos^ Barzelatto, Judith Bruce,
Lynn Freedman, Amy Higer, Carolyn Mak-
inson. Faith Mitchell, Shara Neidell, Steven
Sinding, Sylvia Tesh, Nahid Toubia, and
Charles Westoff, and for interviews with Bar-
bara Crane, Susan Davis, Joan Dunlop,
Adrienne Germain, Margaret Hempel, Eliza-
beth McGrory, and Thomas Merrick.
1 For the purposes of this article, we
consider both feminism and neo-Malthusi-
anism to be social movements. The defini-
tion of a social movement is contested. 'So-
cial movements are often described as
collective responses to a group's experience
of subordination" (Buechler 1990: 9), re-
sponses that are often directed at the state.
This definition fits feminism well, but the
neo-Malthusian movement less well, since,
like the temperance movement or the envi-
ronmental movement, it is a collective re-
sponse to the behavior of other groups or to
conditions that affea many. (For an intro-
duction to the social movement literature,
see McCarthy and Zald 1977; Piven and
Cioward 1977; McAdam 1982; Buechler
1990; Morris and Mueller 1992; and Dalton
and Kuechler 1990). Currently, the two
dominant perspectives on social movements
are those of the politics of resource mobili-
zation and the politics of identity. The first
privileges formal organizations and their at-
tempts to mobilize resources (including
funds, members, and allies); the second
privileges more broadly social movement
communities, including those who may be
members of a social movement by virtue of
their shared values (peace, the environment,
feminism) but may not be associated with
any movement organization. We draw from
both perspectives. Because the Cairo docu-
ment was the produa of formal organizations,
we focus on the behavior of organizations, al-
though we point out that the concept of a
feminist identity is important in understand-
ing the behavior of feminist organizations in
elaborating and promoting a feminist popu-
lation policy.
2 In privileging ideologies, we recognize
that we are ignoring many other aspects of
social movements. One important aspect is
the degree to which a social movement is in-
stitutionalized, with organizational struc-
tures, bureaucracies, and budgets. At the
time of the Cairo conference the population
movement had more elaborate structures,
larger bureaucrades, and larger budgets than
the feminist reproductive health movement.
The institutionalization of these social move-
ments is clearly an area that needs more de-
tailed research. As we suggest later, however,
one incentive for some members of the
population movement to ally themselves
with the feminists may have been to attempt
to preserve these structures, bureaucracies,
and budgets in the face of declining interest
within the United States in third world popu-
lation growth.
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3 We have found little in the literature
about the process by which alliances among
social movements are formed or dissolved,
although there is considerable evidence (es-
pecially regarding the 'New Social Move-
ments" of the 1960s and 1970s) that social
movements influence one another (see, for
example, Meyer and Whittier 1994).
4 The word "feminism" came into fre-
quent use during the 1910s, at the height of
the suffrage movement (Cott 1987: 3): 'The
new language of Feminism marked the end
of the woman movement and the embarka-
tion on a modern agenda.' Today the term
has taken on additional connotations for
some, and we recognize that many of the
women and men whom we label as "femi-
nists" might not identify themselves as such.
We use the term simply to refer to those who
seek greater equality between men and
women.
5 Although some have questioned birth
controllers' feminist credentials, we consider
them to have been protagonists of a pragmatic
feminist movement that considered a wom-
an's control over reproduction to be a pre-
requisite for gender equality. Margaret Sanger
fashioned a birth control movement that is
difficult to classify since it employed both
feminist and population control rhetoric.
Some believe (e.g., Gordon 1976, 1990) that
Sanger's break with the Left and her adop-
tion of population control doctrines entailed
a desertion of feminism. They consider the
doaor-staffed birth control clinics that Sang-
er established with the contributions of so-
ciety-women as charities aimed at reducing
the poor's fertility, not true self-help organi-
zations for women. Others (e.g., Chesler 1992),
embracing Sanger's contention that control
over reproduaion must precede meaningful
enhancement of women's status, place Sanger
high on the list of twentieth-century femi-
nists. We find Sanger to be a pragmatic femi-
nist whose goal was to secure for American
women the legal right to contraception.
6 Nafis Sadik, Executive Director of the
United Nations Population Fund, expressed
this point (1996) succinctly:
American leaders were among the first to
state that there is a link between popula-
tion and poverty; American women have
led the fight for autonomy and equality.
America was the driving force behind set-
ting up UNFPA; America has historically
been the biggest supporter of population
and development programmes, and it was
American leadership above all which drove
the Cairo process along and brought it to a
successful conclusion.
7 An important issue that we do not ad-
dress in this article is the impact of popula-
tion policy. As one reviewer, who is uncon-
vinced that it does have an impact, said:
'dogs bark and the caravan progresses." To
speak to this issue would greatly extend an
already lengthy article. In brief, however, we
are convinced that population policy does
matter, at least in some contexts. For ex-
ample, in Kenya the adoption of a popula-
tion policy by President Kenyatta's govern-
ment in 1967 opened a tap for funds that
increasingly gushed from donors, and recent
work by Deborah Barrett and Amy Tsui
(1997) showed that third world countries
adopting a neo-Malthusian policy typically
experienced an increase in financial aid. In
the case of Kenya, donors were disappointed
with the results, as the funds were not spent
as they had expeaed. Some funds, however,
were used to train clinic workers in family
planning. Although Kenya's total fertility
rate did not decline until nearly two decades
after the funds started flowing, nonetheless
there was a steady increase over that period
in the proportion of women of reproductive
age using birth control. Although it is pos-
sible to argue a counterfactual—that this
would have happened anyway for other rea-
sons—we find it difficult to believe that the
chain of events leading from the policy to
the funds and to the increased availability
of services had no impaa on levels of con-
traceptive use.
8 A more extended treatment of this pe-
riod is available in Hodgson and Watkins
(1995).
9 After suffrage had been gained, Alice
Paul and the National Woman's Party sought
to rally American women around a goal of
ending all legal discrimination against wom-
en. Wishing to preserve solidarity by keep-
ing feminism's focus narrow, Paul attempted
to prevent discussion at the NWP's 1921 con-
vention of issues she feared might divide
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women, among which she included race re-
lations, disarmament, and birth control (Cott
1987: 68). Although the NWP did focus its
efforts on passing an equal rights amend-
ment, women never united behind this goal.
The leadership of the NWP defined equality
as embodied in laws that treat men and
women in an identical fashion, and many
women who had fought for laws that offered
women special protection objected to this
definition. By the end of the 1920s "femi-
nism" had become a divisive term among
American women (Cott 1987: 134-135).
10 Thompson did nothing to avoid con-
troversy. Indeed, his early writings on the
demography of Japan (1929b: 18-48, 113-
139; 1930: 225-226, 264-269, 359-366)
were aimed at convincing Western policy-
makers of the demographic necessity of Japa-
nese territorial expansion. During the 1930s
demographers even took upon themselves
the task of refuting the demographic valid-
ity of Germany's Lebensraum arguments for
expansion into Eastern Europe (Kuczynski
1939).
11 Szreter (1993) argues that the "loss"
of China to the 'free world" after World War
n made policymakers especially sensitive to
the political hazards associated with disrup-
tive social changes in Asia.
12 During the time when members of
the Princeton group were formulating tran-
sition theory, no mention was made of
Thompson's 1929 work. In 1950 Notestein
noted that he had just come across this older
work (1950: 335).
13 Sanger might have made more of an
impact on the ability of women to control
their fertility by counseling heiress Katherine
McCormick to fund the birth control pill re-
search of Gregory Pincus and John Rock
than she did by her IPPF labors.
14 For an interesting treatment of the
players at this conference see the account
offered in the Population Bulletin, especially
the section entitled 'Communists, Roman
Catholics and 'Neo-Malthusians' make
strange bedfellows" (Cook 1955: 96-99).
15 John D. Rockefeller 3rd made the fol-
lowing plea in 1960 (quoted in Piotrow
1973:49):
The problems of population are so great, so
important, so ramified and so immediate
that only government, supported and in-
spired by private initiative, can attack them
on the scale required. It is for the citizens
to convince their political leaders of the
need for imaginative and courageous ac-
tion—action which may sometimes mean
political and economic opposition.
16 Berelson (1966: 665-666), for in-
stance, noted this additional attribute of the
KAP survey: 'As an example, the KAP sur-
vey done in Turkey in 1963 was given wide
attention and contributed to bringing about
the recent change in national population
policy. It may even be, contrary to the typi-
cal impression of national elites, that there
is more political potential in this issue than
political risk."
17 It is interesting to note that IPPF now
has removed all hint of neo-Malthusianism
from its mission statement. Its "Strategic
Plan—Vision 2000" document (International
Planned Parenthood Federation 1995) dedi-
cates the organization to protecting indi-
vidual reproductive rights: "To increase ef-
forts to safeguard the individual's right to
make free and informed choices in regard to
reproductive and sexual health." There are
even hints of anti-Malthusianism, with a
promise to "contribute to and influence the
debate on population/development and the
environment in a manner that ensures the
protection of the rights of the underprivi-
leged to the benefits of development, and
protects women's right to health against the
pressures of imposed demographic goals."
18 The full memorandum was declassi-
fied on 3 July 1989 and is reprinted in
Mumford (1994: 47-186); the 29-page Ex-
ecutive Summary of the memorandum had
been declassified in 1982 and reprinted in
Population and Development Review 8, no. 2. The
13 countries are Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tur-
key, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Thailand,
India, Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia, and the
Philippines.
19 One exception was a group of gradu-
ate students in demography who during the
late 1960s and early 1970s published Con-
cerned Demography and identified with third
world interests (Greenhalgh 1996).
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20 Nor were they mentioned—if our
memories serve—in our graduate training in
demography in the 1970s.
21 Supreme Court decisions holding
that an individual's constitutional right to
privacy included the right to make birth con-
trol decisions with minimum state interfer-
ence expanded legal access to contraception
and abortion in the United States. Although
Roe V. Wade provoked a movement to amend
the Constitution and criminalize abortion,
American feminists realized that emphasiz-
ing the fundamental nature of this right was
its best defense.
22 For the debate on the role of family
planning programs in fertility decline see
Pritchett (1994) and Bongaarts (1994).
23 It is likely that considerable interna-
tional pressure was exerted to achieve this.
A dissertation hy Deborah Barrett (1995)
shows that most of the policies adopted were
virtually identical in wording, and the tim-
ing of a country's adoption of a population
policy was associated not only with domes-
tic conditions (e.g., per capita GDP, popula-
tion density) but also with the extent of its
participation in (or isolation from) the inter-
national community.
24 The National Abortion Rights Action
League has changed its name to the National
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League.
25 In 1973 36.6 percent of American
women were using the pill; by 1982 only
20.7 percent of women were using it (Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics 1994: Table
16).
26 We are grateful to Vaughan (1996)
for this insight.
27 The Global 2000 Report contended that
the population of sub-Saharan Africa had al-
ready exceeded that region's carrying capac-
ity, and that the entire world would reach
that unenviable state within the next cen-
tury. It predicted mortality rise unless rates
of population growth were lowered soon.
28 Donaldson (1990: 132) and Moffett
(1994: 286-287) describe the pressures
within USAID to adopt new health ration-
ales for its family planning program. Moffett
contends:
By the end of the Reagan years, moreover,
the expenditures that were being made were
being justified on a substantially narrower
basis. Since its inception, the population pro-
gram within U.S. AID had been devoted pri-
marily, if not exclusively, to demographic
goals Under pressure from the right, such
cosmic justifications were jettisoned during
the Reagan administration in favor of the nar-
rower though still important goal of improv-
ing family welfare—in particular maternal
and child health—through greater access to
family planning.
It is unclear whether much change occurred
in the actual implementation of AID-spon-
sored family planning programs.
29 Despite changes in their rate of
growth, funds have continued to flow. There
are no firm estimates of the annual expen-
ditures on population programs, but a com-
monly used figure (Mauldin 1995) for recent
years is $4.5 to $5 billion, $1 billion of which
comes from donors, including more than
$350 million from the US government.
30 It is found in Principle 8 (United Na-
tions 1992), which states: "To achieve sus-
tainable development and a higher quality
of life for all people. States should reduce and
eliminate unsustainable patterns of produc-
tion and consumption and promote appro-
priate demographic policies."
31 Margaret Hempel of the Ford Foun-
dation noted (1994): "I thought that the en-
vironmental groups were going to be the big
'bully on the block.'" Yet she found that 'in
the end, they have been the least of the prob-
lem."
32 Wethank Amy Higer (1996) for per-
mission to quote from the draft introduction
to her dissertation-in-progress. Everyone we
interviewed specifically credits the Interna-
tional Women's Health Coalition with a lead-
ing role in integrating women's reprodurtive
health in the Cairo agenda.
33 For example, inside USAID as well as
within agencies that cooperated with it, a
loose network of reproductive health femi-
nists (many in low-level but sensitive posi-
tions) had formed in order to pressure the
agency to meet women's reproductive health
needs. They set up a Reproductive Health
Task Force, a Gender Working Group, an
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Adolescent Health Working Group, and an
Abortion Working Group (Higer 1996 and
personal communication).
34 Assessing the influence of Southern
feminists is beyond the scope of this article,
but an in-depth analysis of the interactions
between Northern and Southern feminists is
much needed. The relationship between
such feminists in the international women's
reproductive health movement is not easy
to categorize. Southern feminists speak with
authority about the hopes and fears of
Southern women, the main population to be
served by the movement, and their judg-
ments are accorded great respect. Yet their
participation in international meetings and
conferences usually is heavily subsidized by
certain foundations and Northern govern-
ments. Northern feminists actively lobby to
secure this funding and often are in a posi-
tion to influence the level and composition
of Southern representation.
35 Dunlop had previously been the
"population aide" to John D. Rockefeller 3rd,
hired in 1973, and had influenced his 'con-
version" to a developmentalist position at
Bucharest in 1974 (Harr and Johnson 1991:
423-442); she thus had a history of both co-
operation with and opposition to the neo-
Malthusian movement. Adrienne Germain
had previously worked for the Ford Foun-
dation, and at the time she first joined the
International Women's Health Coahtion she
was a visiting senior associate at the Popu-
lation Council. Both were well connected in
foundation drcles, which may have facili-
tated IWHC's ability to raise funds from
foundations.
36 A 1983 IWHC brochure described its
mission as dealing with problems of wom-
en's health and rapid population growth.
There is no use of the term 'reproductive
rights," although women are seen as hav-
ing the right to choose whether and when
to have children.
37 Also included were child survival and
primary health care professionals, women's
health advocates, feminists 'concerned with
'women in development,'" and general pro-
ponents of 'social justice and human rights
who recognize that women cannot exercise
their basic rights fully unless they have ef-
feaive access to comprehensive reproductive
health care."
38 Many of these issues were well de-
veloped in a series of papers by Judith Bruce
and her colleagues (see, for example, Bruce
1987, 1990).
39 Some notable population-oriented
representatives declined the invitation: the
Centre for Development and Population Ac-
tivities (CEDPA), Population Action Interna-
tional (PAI), and Steven Sinding, Director of
Population Sdences at the Rockefeller Foun-
dation.
40 WEDO's leaders shared these suspi-
cions of neo-Malthusian efforts. For instance,
Susan Davis contended (1994) that third
world poverty 'fundamentally is a develop-
ment problem and the populationists' way
of looking at the world is such a narrow way
of looking at the world that it doesn't un-
derstand the root causes of the problems . . .
it really does not address inequity and rac-
ism."
41 According to Nahid Toubia, a partici-
pant at the Rio meeting, only one numeri-
cal vote on a resolution was taken, and in
that vote the majority declared that a femi-
nist agenda should not include a population
policy since any population policy entails
controlling women's bodies.
42 Six weeks earlier, however, Speidel
had pointed out that 'they [advocates of a
feminist population policy] never face the is-
sue of what to do when resources are scarce,
and they are" (quoted in Chira 1994: A12).
43 'Common ground" was the phrase for
this agenda that appeared a number of years
before Cairo. For example, 'Creating common
ground," published hy the World Health Or-
ganization, is the report of 'a meeting between
women's health advocates and sdentists" or-
ganized by WHO and IWHC in Geneva in
1991. Hartmann, a long-time critic of popula-
tion control activities (1987, 1995), claimed
that this 'common ground" consensus was
"manufartured by a few powerful funders,"
specifically mentioning the Pew Charitable
Trusts, Wirth's office at the State Department,
tJNFPA, and Ted Turner (quoted in Greene
1994: 7-8). The Ford and MacArthur Foun-
dations also provided funding.
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44 Pope John Paul II met with President
Clinton in June 1994 to discuss his concerns
about the Cairo conference, and a week be-
fore the start of the conference Vatican
spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls personally
assailed Vice President Gore, the head of the
US delegation, for his alleged support of
"abortion on demand." The preeminent po-
sition that struggles over abortion wording
assumed in Program of Action negotiations
itself reflects a conference driven more by
Northern than Southern concerns. In our
view abortion is more a symbolic issue for
Northern feminists, especially American
feminists, than it is for Southern feminists.
45 For the hallway discussions, we rely
on informal reports from a number of people
who were there. For the press analysis, we
rely on Neidell's (forthcoming) analysis of ar-
ticles on the Cairo conference published in
the New York Times between 18 August 1994
and 14 September 1994, which showed that
coverage emphasized the issues of women's
empowerment and abortion.
46 Petchesky (1995) contends that after
ratification of the Program of Action at Cairo,
feminists must also worry about ignoring is-
sues of class, race, and justice. Although the
document "enshrines an almost-feminist vi-
sion of reproductive rights and gender equal-
ity in place of the old population control dis-
course," it also "retains a mainstream model
of development under which that vision can-
not possibly be realized" (1995: 152).
47 Even emphasis on women's auto-
nomy is suspect to some (Bandarage 1994:
12): "As fertility control is presented increas-
ingly as the means for women's empower-
ment, feminist criticisms of coercion and ex-
perimentation within family planning
programs get softened; the resurgence of eu-
genics associated with the growth of new re-
produrtive technologies gets overlooked; and
the social structural roots of women's sub-
ordination and the global crisis tend to be
forgotten."
48 Paragraph 4.15 of the Program of Ac-
tion states that "'son preference'... is often
compounded by the increasing use of tech-
nologies to determine foetal sex, resulting in
abortion of female foetuses." Daniel Good-
kind (1996a, 1996b) treats a number of is-
sues surrounding sex-selective abortion that
did not get addressed at the Cairo confer-
ence.
49 One donor has speculated in confi-
dence that the US Congress might possibly
be interested in the reproductive health of
women in Anacostia, a poor and largely
black section of Washington, D.C, but is un-
likely ever to he interested in the reproduc-
tive health of women in Bangladesh.
50 Camp (1994: 124-126) questions
whether this is the case. She contends that
US antiabortion forces are also opposed to
'all methods of birth control" and actively
seek to 'tar family planning with the pro-
abortion brush."
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